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THE BERLIN CONGRESS

By
HENRY F. MUNRO

This study is confined to the technique, procedure, and general conduct of the Berlin Congress. It presupposes knowledge of the questions discussed and of the settlements arrived at in the Treaty of Berlin

COMPLETED OCTOBER 14, 1918



WASHINGTON
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THE BERLIN CONGRESS, 1878.

By comparison with the Congresses of Westphalia, Utrecht and Vienna, the Berlin Congress of 1878 was single in purpose and limited in scope. The earlier assemblies in each case marked the close of long, desolating wars, during which Europe had been ranged into two camps. Most European states, great and small, had representation and a complexity of questions, territorial, economic, and political, found more or less permanent solution.

The Congress of Berlin was quite otherwise. Its purpose was confined to the Eastern Question, so called, as it had been recently revived by the Balkan troubles and the Russo-Turkish War. Its announced purpose was the revision of the treaty of San Stefano of March 3, 1878, in the interest of the public law of Europe, especially as set forth in the treaty of Paris of 1856.¹ Its real purpose was to impose upon victorious Russia, on the demand of Great Britain and Austria, the mandate of the Powers that she retrench her conquests and spare the Ottoman Empire the *coup de grâce*. Germany, in the person of Bismarck, was the "broker" and received her commission in the definitive adoption by Austria of a policy of expansion in the Balkans and the consequent abandonment by her of any lingering desire to challenge the decisions of Sadowa and Sedan.² The Dual Alliance of 1879 was the visible sign that Germany had her reward.

PRELIMINARY AGREEMENTS.

Not only was the field of discussion limited but the discussion itself was in large part perfunctory.³ The

¹ "The stipulations of this treaty are in several points of a nature to modify the state of things as fixed by former European conventions, and it is for the purpose of submitting the work of San Stefano to the free discussion of the Cabinets signatories of the treaty, of 1856 and 1871 that we have assembled. Our object is to secure by common agreements and on the basis of new guarantees, that peace of which Europe so much stands in need"—Speech of Bismarck at opening session of the Congress, June 13, 1878. (Parliamentary Papers, 1878 [C. 2081]. Correspondence respecting the Congress at Berlin, p. 12.)

² Moüy, *Souvenirs d'un diplomate* in *Revue des deux Mondes*, Oct. 15, 1904, p. 726.

³ A further restriction on the scope of the Congress was placed by France, for, in accepting the invitation to participate, M. Waddington stipulated that there should be no discussion of Egypt, Lebanon, or the Holy Places. See Moüy, *loc. cit.*, p. 729; Avril *Négociations relatives au traité de Berlin*, p. 280; Hanotaux, *Contemporary France*, IV, pp. 342-344.

decrees of the high assembly had been formulated in advance and the machinery of the Congress served but to register them.¹ A series of agreements between the interested powers, made in contemplation of the Russo-Turkish War or of the Congress, indicated the lines of settlement and left merely the details for the consideration of the plenipotentiaries at Berlin. The chief preliminary agreements were the following:

Reichstadt agreement.

Anglo-Russian convention.

Cyprus convention.

Anglo-Austrian agreement.

Preliminary understandings.

1. The Reichstadt Agreement, July 8, 1878, between Russia and Austria, supplemented by further agreements between the same powers, in January and April, 1877. These agreements formed the basis for the Austrian occupation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Russia, in turn, stipulated for Bessarabia.²

2. The secret agreement between Great Britain and Russia, May 30, 1878. This made the Congress possible and virtually dictated the terms of settlement. All the points of the treaty of San Stefano were to be discussed.³

3. The Cyprus Convention, June 4, 1878, between Great Britain and Turkey. Russia, and probably Germany, were informed of this convention before the congress met.⁴

4. The secret agreement between Great Britain and Austria, June 6, 1878. (Sosnosky, *op. cit.*, I, p. 170, citing Fournier, *Wie Wir zu Bosnia Kamen*, p. 63.) As a result of this, Great Britain supported Austrian occupation of Bosnia-Herzegovina.⁵

5. Pourparlers between Great Britain, Germany, and Austria resulting in a general understanding as to the policy to be pursued at the congress.⁶

INITIATION OF THE CONGRESS.

The months preceding the Congress were filled with political pronouncement and diplomatic exchange of which it is no part of this study to give even a résumé.⁷

¹ Larmeroux, *L'Autriche-Hongrie au Congrès de Berlin*, p. 86; Avril, *op. cit.*, p. 266.

² Sosnosky, *Die Balkanpolitik Oesterreich-Ungarns*, I, pp. 151-152, 160-161; Larmeroux, *op. cit.*, pp. 43-44, 60; Coolidge, *Origins of the Triple Alliance*, pp. 96, 113-114; Hanotaux, *op. cit.*, IV, p. 361 (note).

³ Staatsarchiv, vol. 34, No. 6749. Avril, *op. cit.*, pp. 345-346. Hohenlohe, *Memoirs* (Eng. tr.), p. 206; Rose, *Development of European Nations*, I, p. 278; Argyll, *Duke of The Eastern Question*, II, pp. 136, 144.

⁴ Cf. Müller, *Politische Geschichte der Gegenwart*, XII, p. 109. Caratheodory Pasha, however, one of the Turkish plenipotentiaries at the Congress, who himself was unaware of the convention until July 4, was of opinion that it was Austria and Germany that knew of it in advance. See Hanotaux, *op. cit.*, IV, p. 375 (note). For the text of the Cyprus Convention, see Hertslet, *Map of Europe by Treaty*, IV, pp. 2722-2725.

⁵ "You will not forget the ancient alliance between Austria and this country, and the general coincidence of their interests. It is important that in the discussions of the congress on these matters you should support any legitimate proposals tending to benefit and strengthen the Austro-Hungarian monarchy. * * *" Lord Salisbury to Lord Odo Russell, June 8, 1878 (British and Foreign State Papers, LXIX, p. 833).

⁶ Moüy, *op. cit.*, p. 726.

⁷ For the diplomatic exchanges, see British and Foreign State Papers, LXIX, pp. 794-830. Cf. also Bismarck's Speech in the Reichstag, February 19, 1878, in Hahn, *Fürst Bismarck*, vol. 3, pp. 80-98. See also Hansard, *Parliamentary Debates*, 3d ser., vols. 237-240, *passim.*; Müller, *Politische Geschichte der Gegenwart*, XII, pp. 78-79 (Andrassy's speech).

Suffice it to state that it was Austria which first proposed collective action in the suggestion, on February 5, 1878, that the Eastern Question be submitted to a conference of the powers signatory to the treaty of Paris of 1856 and the London Protocol of 1871. Vienna (later Baden) was indicated as the place of meeting. However, after the treaty of San Stefano had been signed, Austria, on March 7, substituted a proposal for a congress at Berlin to be attended by the Prime Ministers of the Great Powers.¹ This met with acceptance, especially after the Anglo-Russian agreement of May 30, and on June 3 formal invitations to the Congress were issued by the German Government, the powers consenting, so the invitation ran, "to admit the free discussion of the whole contents of the treaty of San Stefano." (Hertslet, *op. cit.*, IV, p. 2721.)

A conference first proposed.

Germany issues the invitation.

REPRESENTATION AND PERSONNEL.

The congress held its sessions, twenty in all, at the Chancellor's palace in Berlin from June 13 to July 13, 1878. Accredited plenipotentiaries were present from the six Great Powers and from Turkey, being the signatory powers of the treaty of Paris of March 30, 1856. Representatives from other interested States were admitted on occasion for the purpose of laying their specific claims before the Congress, but took no part in its deliberations. For instance, at the ninth session (June 29) the Greek Foreign Minister and the Greek Minister at Berlin presented the views of their Government in matters affecting Greek interests and retired immediately thereafter, being informed that "the Congress, when it shall have studied the considerations presented by the Hellenic representatives, will communicate to them the result of their deliberations." (Parliamentary Papers, 1878 [C. 2083], Correspondence relating to the Congress of Berlin, p. 135). So also with the Roumanian representatives at the tenth, and the Persian Minister at the

Place and time of meeting.

Powers represented.

Occasional admission of other representatives.

Greece,

Roumania and Persia heard.

¹ "From the point of view of International Law there is no essential difference between congresses and conferences * * *. Congresses have usually been convoked for the negotiation of a peace between belligerent powers and the redistribution of territory which in most cases is one of the conditions of peace. At a congress, as a rule, more than two powers have been represented * * *. In the nineteenth century, congresses, properly so called, were held mostly at the capital of one of the powers concerned and then the Chancellor or Minister for Foreign Affairs presided. It will be found that on these occasions, besides the specially deputed plenipotentiaries, the local diplomatic representatives of the respective powers were also appointed." (Satow, *Diplomatic Practice*, II, pp. 1-2.)

Serbia and Montenegro excluded.

fifteenth, session. (Ibid., pp. 151, 224.) Serbia, on the other hand, and Montenegro did not have even this limited measure of representation.

Secretaries and technical personnel.

Twenty representatives in all participated, three from each of the powers invited, save Italy, which sent only two. The leading powers designated as first plenipotentiaries their most prominent statesmen—Bismarck, Disraeli, Gortchakoff, Andrassy.¹ Included in the list were the foreign ministers of most of the Governments participating, as well as all their respective ambassadors accredited to the court of Berlin.² Each mission was surrounded with a personnel of secretaries, diplomats, technical functionaries, experts, and military advisers. On the Austrian staff, for example, in addition to the three plenipotentiaries, were Baron Schwegel, chief of the commercial and consular section in the Ministry of

¹ "Who would be the men to represent the powers at this congress? As a rule it was the business of the diplomatic circles. But this time Bismarck was presiding, the ministers would therefore wish to figure in it. Lord Beaconsfield sought therein the apotheosis of his brilliant career. * * * It was not without lively criticism that his resolve to attend the congress was made known, even from the ranks of Conservatives—

"From the constitutional point of view, it is rather despotic; from the standpoint of tradition, it is without precedent. * * * Lord Beaconsfield in the House of Lords took a lofty tone about it, announcing that he assumed the whole responsibility of this step which was taken at the request of his colleagues." (Memorial Diplomatique, 1878, p. 378)." Hanotaux, Contemporary France, IV, p. 339.

The appointment of Gortchakoff was due to his own personal insistence. Schouvaloff, whom Gortchakoff supplanted as First Plenipotentiary, has this to say of it:

"This is a further proof of how much is sacrificed with us to personal considerations. The Emperor knew that Prince Gortchakoff had no personal weight; he knew the strong feeling that Prince Bismarck harboured against the Russian Chancellor; his presence in Berlin could only be harmful to our cause. All this was quite palpable, and yet, in spite of everything, Prince Gortchakoff was authorized to come to Berlin." (Cited in Hanotaux, op. cit., IV, p. 340.)

Hohenlohe was of opinion that Bismarck chose him, "in order to be able to say to the King of Bavaria that, out of consideration for his Majesty, they had taken his Majesty's Kronoberstkämmerer (Lord High Chamberlain)." Hohenlohe, Memoirs, II, p. 207.

² The complete list of the plenipotentiaries is as follows:

"For Germany, Prince Bismarck, Chancellor; Herr von Bülow, Secretary of State in the Department of Foreign Affairs; Prince Hohenlohe-Schillingfürst, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary at Paris.

"For Austria, Count Andrassy, Minister of the Imperial Household and of Foreign Affairs; Count Karolyi, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary at Berlin; Baron Haymerle, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary at Rome.

"For France, M. Waddington, Secretary of State in the Department of Foreign Affairs; Count de Saint-Vallier, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary at Berlin; Mons. Desprez, Director of Political Affairs at the French Foreign Office.

"For Great Britain, Lord Beaconsfield, Prime Minister; Marquis of Salisbury, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs; Lord Odo Russell, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary at Berlin.

"For Italy, Count Corti, Minister for Foreign Affairs; Count de Launay, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary at Berlin.

"For Russia, Prince Gortchakoff, Chancellor; Count Peter Schouvaloff, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary in London; Mons. d'Oubril, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary at Berlin.

"For Turkey, Carathéodory Pasha, Minister of Public Works; Mehemed Ali, General; Sadoullah Bey, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary at Berlin." (Satow Diplomatic Practice, II, pp. 90-91.)

Foreign Affairs, Conseiller de Legation Kosiek, First, Interpreter of the Austrian Embassy in Constantinople, Minister Plenipotentiary von Teschenberg, Conseiller de Legation Baron Hübner, Hofrath Doczy, Private Secretary von Pichy, and several others. (The Times, June 5, 1878.) The British mission included some 40 officials of the foreign office, besides military and other advisers appointed *ad hoc*.¹

BISMARCK CHOSEN PRESIDENT.

The choice of Berlin as the place of meeting implied, *ipso facto*, that Bismarck would preside over its deliberations, and this quite apart from political considerations. At Vienna (1815), Paris (1856), and London (1871), it had been established that the presidency of such high assembly should vest in the representative of the sovereign whose hospitality it enjoyed. Accordingly, at the opening session on June 13, after Bismarck had proposed that the Congress proceed to elect its officials, Andrassy, having previously consulted with the other plenipotentiaries, nominated the German Chancellor as president. There was unanimous agreement in his election to the august office.²

Precedent at congresses.

Andrassy nominates Bismarck.

RULES OF PRECEDENCE, ETC.

In details of diplomatic etiquette, the Berlin Congress was free from those humorously petty, but mock-important, incidents that characterized the proceedings of congresses in the seventeenth and the eighteenth centuries. Seating arrangements were in accordance with the rules of diplomatic practice, as were also all matters

Seating arrangements.

¹ For a list of the personnel deputed to take part in the work of the Congress, see The Times, June 13 and 14, 1878 (*infra*, Appendix I). See also Moüy in *Revue des deux Mondes*, Oct. 15, 1904, pp. 739-740.

As at all Congresses, numerous persons were present, officially and otherwise, to urge various claims. De Blowitz, the famous correspondent, writes thus of them:

"The Congress * * * has also favoured us with an influx of professional gentlemen ready to assist in the labours of the meeting. Of these, some have been officially called in to give guidance, others are deputed to advise or petition: others still are watching the proceedings in the interest of commerce, religion, or race. Civil and military agents of all European Powers have flocked hither from all parts of the East. Greek, Servian, Roumanian, Armenian, Albanian, Bulgarian, Turkish and Jewish claimants, like so many minor planets, busily revolve round the greater lights of the diplomatic and consular service." The Times, June 20, 1878.

² For the precedents governing the choice, see the statement of Lord Derby in the debate in the House of Lords, March 11, 1878. (Hansard, Parliamentary Debates, 3d ser., vol. 238, pp. 1036-1041). *Infra*, Appendix II.

Signatures.
Language.

of precedence in signatures and otherwise.¹ French was the language of the Congress, although Bismarck professed some diffidence in its use.² According to Hohenlohe, uniform was worn at the opening session in conformity with Lord Beaconsfield's wish.

Uniform.

PRELIMINARY ORGANIZATION.

The Secretariat.

Bismarck, anticipating the functions of his office, was ready with an organized secretariat, at the head of which The Secretariat was M. de Radowitz, German Minister to Greece. His chief colleague was M. le Comte de Moüy, First Secretary of the French Embassy at Berlin; and to assist them Bismarck had designated four functionaries of the German Foreign Office—M. Busch, Baron Holstein, Count Herbert Bismarck and M. Bücher, the latter the "secretarial archivist." The work of the secretariat and its division of labor have been thus described by de Moüy:

Its duties.

"The editorship of the protocols was put in my charge
* * * Unquestionably I had to come to an agreement with M. de Radowitz for the exact reproduction of the debates, but without my being subordinate to him; and each protocol, edited entirely by myself, was submitted only to the authority of the Congress. I must add that my colleague and I were always in perfect accord. He prepared the orders of the day, watched over the division of the work, elaborated the notes necessary to clarify the discussions, reread the projected protocols with me, and above all, under the direction of the president, was in constant, and often confidential communication with the plenipotentiaries. My task, far less complex, did not, however, cease being troublesome, since I had to concentrate the discussions, which were often long and confused, into brief and clear form, without weakening or exaggerating the thoughts of the orators, but it was a

¹ For the rules of precedence, see Satow, *Diplomatic Practice*, I, pp. 351-353; II, pp. 182-183.

"In what was formerly the great ball room a green table, shaped like a horseshoe, had been placed. In the middle the president's seat; on either side France, left: Austria, right; then England next to Austria, Italy to France; further down Russia on the right, Turkey on the left. Opposite Bismarck sits Radowitz as recorder; I [Hohenlohe] on the left, Bülow on the right." Hohenlohe, *op. cit.*, II, p. 207.

² "The Imperial Chancellor accompanied me into another room, and spoke again of the difficulty which was caused him by presiding in French. He had, however, done extremely well, and no one had noticed the embarrassment which he professed to have felt." Hohenlohe, *Memoirs*, II, p. 210.

While the use of French was official, other languages were employed by the plenipotentiaries. For example, at the opening session Lord Beaconsfield "made a long speech in English, very clear and emphatic." *Ibid.*, II, p. 208.

very definite task, and I did not have to concern myself in any way with the business reserved to the chief of the secretariat and to the assistants designated to him by the Chancellor." (*Revue des deux Mondes*, Oct. 15, 1904, pp. 735-736.)

In addition to its routine duties, the secretariat was commissioned by the president to collect and submit for examination the documents and full powers from which the plenipotentiaries derived their competence. These were presented the first day (with the exception of those of the Turkish representatives, two of whom had not yet arrived), and found to be in good and due form. The Ottoman plenipotentiaries presented their full powers at the next session.

Full powers.

PROTOCOLS.¹

At the first session Bismarck made the suggestion, which met with the approval of the members, that "all propositions and documents destined to appear in the protocol should be drawn up in writing and read by those members of the congress who initiate them."² When drawn up, the protocols were promptly printed and distributed among the plenipotentiaries and, in conformity with the suggestion of Bismarck, this distribution was substituted for the customary reading, at each session, of the protocol recording the minutes of the previous session, except that of the first day's proceedings, which was duly read. If no change was suggested by anyone, the text was considered as approved. It was understood, of course, that any member could request the reading of the entire protocol.³

Protocols not read.

¹ "During a congress or a conference, no matter for what object or purpose, the minutes of meetings of the plenipotentiaries are styled either protocol or *proces-verbal* indifferently. Perhaps the former word is the more dignified." Satow, *Diplomatic Practice* II, p. 236.

² *Parliamentary Papers*, 1878, (38) Correspondence relating to the Congress of Berlin with the Protocols of the Congress, Turkey, No. 39 (1878) [C. 2083], p. 12 (Hereafter cited as Protocols). For the protocols, see also *British and Foreign State Papers*, Vol. LXIX, pp. 862-1078.

³ Hanotaux quotes the Turkish First Plenipotentiary as follows:

"The official protocols give a faithful report of the work of the congress, and an official summary of it, but beneath the diplomatic envelope which uniformly covers all the parts, it is hard to find the true aspect of the details. Further, also, the protocols were not reread during the meetings and very important modifications were permitted to be introduced into them." (*Unpublished Memoirs of Carathéodory Pasha*.) *Contemporary France*, IV, p. 346 (note).

PETITIONS.

Various petitions and documents "of very disproportionate importance" were addressed to the Congress or the President. Bismarck instructed the secretariat to make a selection of such as were of political interest, summarize them and distribute the lists to the members of the Congress. In principle, no proposals or documents were submitted to the Congress unless introduced by one of the plenipotentiaries and by this rule the reception of petitions was governed. Anonymous petitions were not included in the lists in any case but were placed on file at the secretary's office.¹

GENERAL PROCEDURE.

In the course of the early exchanges over the proposed conference, Germany had suggested "a preliminary conference of second plenipotentiaries or, better still, of their representatives accredited here [Berlin] in order to make preparation in regard to matter and form for the deliberations of the Conference."² Such does not appear to have been instituted in anticipation of the Berlin Congress. According to the Vienna correspondent of *The Times*, however, the German Government had prepared for the consideration of the plenipotentiaries a form of procedure based on the rules followed at the Congress of Paris in 1856.³ But Bismarck made no reference to the Paris rules in his remarks on procedure at the opening session, nor do the protocols furnish any information on the point. In his observations on assuming the office of president, he proposed that the questions arising out of the treaty of San Stefano should be classified and discussed in the order of their importance. On this view of it, Bulgaria, its delimitation and future organization, called for first consideration and the secretariat was instructed to prepare the orders of the day accordingly. Further, Bismarck thought it advis-

¹ Protocols, pp. 22, 34.

² Memorandum from Berlin, March 15, 1878. British and Foreign State Papers, vol. LXIX, p. 802.

³ "A project to this effect [for regulating the proceedings] based on the rules observed at the Paris Conference of 1856, has been prepared by the German Government and communicated to the plenipotentiaries, so as to give them time and opportunity to study it and consult about any amendments deemed desirable before the subject comes on in to-morrow's sitting. It is thought probable, too, that the project will be accepted, such as it is, with the addition of some provisions concerning the formal sanction of resolutions to be passed." *The Times*, June 12, 1878.

able to have an interval of some days before the second session "in order to give time to the plenipotentiaries to exchange their ideas." Finally, he did not doubt that the plenipotentiaries would "be unanimous as to the necessity of preserving the secrecy of their deliberations."¹

Secrecy.

The order of the day was under the general supervision of the president, who, usually with the assent, and occasionally with the suggestions, of the members, directed the secretariat in the formulation of the subjects for discussion.² Sometimes the Congress collaborated more directly, as at the session of July 2, when, on the exhaustion of the order of the day, it proceeded, on the proposition of Count de Saint Vallier, to make arrangements for the next session.³ To expedite business, it was agreed at the opening sitting that members intending to make new proposals should give notice of such intention at a previous meeting, so that all could be prepared for the discussion, "proposals connected with questions on the order of the day and resulting from the discussion itself to be excepted." Lord Salisbury understood this to apply "only to substantive proposals and not to amendments or secondary questions."⁴

Order of the day.

At the fifth session (June 24) it was emphasized by Bismarck, with the approval of the plenipotentiaries, that only the questions of general European interest should engage the attention of the Congress, in contra-

Only questions of European concern discussed.

¹ Protocols, pp. 12-13.

It is unnecessary to add that Europe was kept fully and accurately informed of each day's proceedings through The Times and other journals. De Blowitz, the famous correspondent of The Times, was intimate with some of the plenipotentiaries, notably with Hohenlohe, and was even employed, unofficially, by Bismarck as a mediator in the Anglo-Russian differences.

"July 2. Home at 5 o'clock. Then at 6 I fetched Blowitz to drive with him to dinner with the Imperial Chancellor. Blowitz was delighted. The Chancellor worked on him in the interests of the Russian claim to Batoum." Hohenlohe, *Memoirs*, II, p. 219.

² The lack of fixed plan made all arrangements at the Congress more or less unstable. This is illustrated by Hohenlohe's account of how a prospectus of points remaining for discussion, which he was having specially prepared at Bismarck's request, was superseded by an outline of Andrassy's that came to the eye of the chancellor.

"This is what happened," says Hohenlohe. "This morning I went to Bülow, who talked once more with me on the subject and said he had commissioned Jasmund to make the résumé. I then proceeded to see Jasmund, who was ready to work out a complete memorandum * * *. I then went to Waddington, told him of the affair, and met with his complete approval. At 1.30 to the congress hall. Schuwaloff laid hold of me and said he already knew of the matter and agreed with it * * *. Then Andrassy came up, who also knew of it. He had already drawn up a plan, and wrote it down for me * * *. The Imperial Chancellor soon came up, and I showed him this sketch. He looked it through and approved it. We then went on to the sitting. Before the conclusion the Chancellor asked for my note, which I handed him. He then proposed that the discussion should follow in order, on the basis of this note. Everyone agreed and Jasmund's work is superfluous." *Memoirs*, II, p. 216.

³ Protocols, p. 172.

⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 14-15.

distinction to those affecting only Russia and Turkey. Minor questions reserved for private interviews. Questions not of an urgent nature were reserved for "private interviews between the powers which take special interest in them." Thus the new treaty which should embody the work of the Congress was to concern itself merely with the disputed stipulations of the Treaty of San Stefano.¹

PROCEDURE ON A GIVEN QUESTION.

The actual method of considering specific questions was indicated in the course of the second session. The British proposal with respect to Bulgaria having been presented by Lord Salisbury, and it appearing that more detailed information was desirable, it was suggested by Bismarck that discussion on the question be adjourned and that meanwhile the interested cabinets try to reach agreement upon as many points as possible. After the Interchange of ideas. of results of this interchange of ideas had been submitted to the Congress, "it would then be the task of the Congress, should the agreement not be fully established, to endeavor to complete it by means of the intervention of the friendly powers."² Count Andrassy having expressed himself as "ready to take part according to parliamentary rules in a general discussion, to be followed by a special discussion," Bismarck agreed, adding that it would be First and second readings. advisable to have a first and a second reading in each case: "The first should take the place of the general discussion, the second would give opportunity for entering into details."² He considered that Private meetings between the plenipotentiaries to settle details. "private and intimate meetings between the representatives of the powers directly interested"—meetings which he recommended without assuming the right to convoke them—"would possess the great advantage of better preparing the ground for an understanding on questions of detail and wording. The chief point for the full meetings of the Congress would be to establish an agreement on questions of principle: when these questions shall have been settled, the method of proceeding will be on the First reading determines principles. second reading establishes the text. second reading to draw up a text destined to replace the articles of the Treaty of San Stefano."³

¹ Protocols, p. 66.

² Protocols, p. 25.

³ Ibid. "In conformity with this mode of proceeding, proposed by the president, the plenipotentiaries of Austria-Hungary, Great Britain, and Russia agree to interchange their views in private meetings with the object of determining the points of agreement and consequently of facilitating the work of the Congress. They will communicate the result of these interviews to their colleagues." Ibid.

At the next session (June 25) Bismarck found it necessary to admonish the Congress on its tendency to consider questions beyond its scope. "His Serene Highness, recurring to a view which he has already had occasion to express, does not think it expedient to discuss secondary questions in the Congress. He regards, for example, that on which they are at present engaged as coming within this category, and he thinks that in raising this question of the assembly of notables, of a Russian commission, and of a European commission, the Congress exceeds the limits assigned for its deliberations; he can not see that this discussion of details is a matter of European interest. * * * Prince Bismarck adds that he would be disposed to put aside the question of Bulgaria so soon as a thorough understanding shall have been arrived at on the essential principles, and then to take into consideration immediately the other most important points of the treaty of San Stefano. * * * He intends to propose at the next meeting that secondary questions shall merely be lightly touched on, and that only objects of a veritable European interest shall be discussed at length.¹ The president has, however, no desire to prejudice the opinions of his colleagues, and the opinion which he has just expressed is an entirely personal one." (Protocols, p. 79.)

In spite of these arrangements, however, the discussion of the Bulgarian question concerned itself with an excess of details. Accordingly, on its conclusion, Bismarck again reminded the plenipotentiaries that the Congress could "only lay down the bases and leave the details to be elaborated by an assembly to be convoked later on, and which would terminate the examination of secondary questions."²

Congress concerned only with general principles.

VOTING.

In the course of his remarks at the first session Bismarck considered it "incontestable that the minority in the Congress shall not be bound to acquiesce in a vote of the majority." But he suggested that resolutions taken by majority vote on minor points should have validity as decisions of the Congress, provided that no

Only an unanimous vote binding.

Majority vote on minor points.

¹ The proposal recorded in the protocol of the next session (June 26) as coming from Bismarck was one constituting a Drafting Committee, "charged with the preparation of a draft of all the stipulations to be inserted in the new treaty, taking into consideration the resolutions recorded in the protocols of the Congress." (Protocols, p. 89.)

² Protocols, p. 94.

formal protest had been entered by the minority.¹ Schouvaloff, at a later sitting, invoked the principle "according to which the congress is not bound by a majority but only by the unanimity of its members."²

Parliamentary
procedure re-
versed.

In putting the question, parliamentary procedure was reversed. For instance, at the third session, when two proposals with reference to the admission of representatives from Greece were before it, the Congress voted first on the main question—the French proposal—as establishing the general principle, and then on the British amendment, the first vote being "considered as conditional—that is to say, as subject to amendment in conformity with the English proposition—should the latter be adopted."³ In this case the votes on the amendment were divided equally, Bismarck voting against it as a representative of Germany.⁴ It was consequently declared lost and the French proposal adopted.

Motion put
first.

Question lost
on equality of
votes.

On occasion, the general principle was approved but provision made for subsequent amendment as to details. For example, at the session of June 22, the Congress accepted the British proposal concerning Bulgaria but reserved the power to introduce into the text of the treaty certain changes of detail which the parties specially interested should agree upon in private discussions. In this instance, M. Waddington was charged with the task of preparing a draft which should reconcile the British proposals with the Russian amendments. Schouvaloff, while agreeing, subordinated his assent "to the right of reverting subsequently to his amendments, for if they were rejected, he must in the first instance refer to his government."⁵ On a later occasion (June 25), Schouvaloff requested permission to take a question ad referendum, and, in consequence, the protocol remained open until such time as Russia's vote was received.⁶

Provision for
subsequent
changes in de-
tails.

Questions taken
ad referendum.
Protocol left
open.

¹ Protocols, p. 14.

² Ibid., p. 64.

³ Ibid., p. 36.

⁴ Bismarck acted at the Congress in a dual capacity. As president he guided its deliberations and continually intervened to reconcile divergent points of view. But as first plenipotentiary of Germany he presented the German position on various questions and often voted *ex parte*, especially when German diplomatic commitments required it. Thus, at the sitting on June 22 he stated that he could not, as German plenipotentiary, "remain entirely neutral" on the question then before the Congress (ibid., p. 49). He argued in support of the Austrian occupation of Bosnia-Herzegovina (ibid., p. 115) and of the cession of Bessarabia to Russia (p. 138). While opposed as German representative to the reception of the Roumanian delegates, "he wished to subordinate his vote to that of the powers more particularly interested" and gave his consent accordingly (ibid., p. 135).

⁵ Ibid., p. 50.

⁶ Ibid., pp. 77, 112.

The Turkish plenipotentiaries repeatedly referred to their government for instructions on given questions. Ibid., pp. 171, 183, 211, 231.

WORKING ORGANIZATION—COMMITTEES.

The actual decisions of the congress were taken through one or other of the following channels:

1. Plenary meetings of the Congress.
2. Preliminary discussions (*pourparlers*) and private agreements among the plenipotentiaries of interested powers.
3. Mediation of "neutral" powers.
4. The Boundary Committee.
5. Military Commissions.
6. The Drafting Committee.

I. PLENARY SESSIONS.

In general, Bismarck adhered closely to his position, early taken, that "the chief point for the full meetings of the Congress would be to establish an agreement on questions of principle," leaving details, if coming within the purview of the Congress, to be arranged by other means.¹ Accordingly, the Congress, under the watchful eye of its president, gave its attention to the broad lines of settlement, carefully relegating secondary questions to committees or to private interviews. If necessary, of course, the Congress in plenary session took final review of all work done by the committees, which implied that it had to concern itself to some extent with details.² Thus, at the sitting of July 6, we find the Congress giving diligent study (and the need was great) to a map, submitted by Schouvaloff, on which were indicated the lines of the Russian concessions in Asia. (Protocols, p. 209.) But as a rule, minor questions were avoided. This ruling of Bismarck, strictly adhered to, enabled him to expedite business and to avoid the danger, always latent, of open disagreement, for the discussion could

Plenary sessions deal with questions of principle.

Secondary questions in committee.
Final review by the congress.

Advantage of Bismarck's ruling.

¹ "The president thinks that the numerous details contemplated by the proposal just read are beyond the task of the Congress. The plenipotentiaries are assembled to accept, reject, or replace the articles of the treaty of San Stefano, but such a detailed development of a special point does not appear to him to come under the province of the High Assembly." Protocols, pp. 167-168.

"The President observes that it is not the business of the Congress to discuss these questions in first sitting, and the Congress decides upon referring the propositions of the first plenipotentiary of Turkey to the Drafting Committee." Ibid., p. 155.

² Prince Hohenlohe having inquired whether the Boundary Committee should submit its work to the Congress before transmitting it to the Drafting Committee, Count de St. Vallier expresses an opinion, shared by the High Assembly, that the Congress should in the first place, approve the work of the Boundary Committee, which should be subsequently referred to the Drafting Committee so far as questions of form are concerned." Protocols, p. 156.

Proceedings artificial.

at any time, on the suggestion of the president, be adjourned for further consideration. It was this knowledge that a given question before the Congress either had been, or could be, settled behind closed doors, that gave its proceedings an artificial, predigested character, and afforded to the chief participants opportunity to indulge in the "high-sounding nothings" of full-dress oratory.¹

Sometimes, when positive discussion in plenary session was inexpedient, the Congress would take notice of motions, observations, or declarations, which otherwise would find no place either in the completed treaty or in the protocols.² It was thus that Salisbury and Schouvaloff had read into the record their respective declarations of policy with regard to the closing of the Turkish straits. (Protocols, pp. 270, 277.)

2. PRIVATE DISCUSSIONS AND AGREEMENTS

Private meetings of Austrian, British, and Russian plenipotentiaries.

The key to the discussions of the Congress is to be found, as has been indicated, in the private meetings of the plenipotentiaries, especially those of Austria, Great Britain, and Russia.³ At the very first sitting Bismarck recommended an intermission of some days for an exchange of ideas, and later in the same session, when the question of the withdrawal of the Russian forces from the vicinity of Constantinople threatened an impasse, he made the specific suggestion that the question should first form the subject of direct discussion between the

Withdrawal of forces discussed privately.

¹ See, for example, the speeches of Gortchakoff, Bismarck, and Beaconsfield in Protocols, pp. 89-90, 206-209.

² "M. de Lamay confines himself to asking for the insertion of his motion in the protocol." *Ibid.*, p. 255.

"Count Corti * * * confines himself to requesting that his observations may be inserted in the protocol." *Ibid.*, p. 256.

³ "The great questions are in reality discussed and solved in the preliminary conferences, and when they are brought before the Congress formally constituted, the minor plenipotentiaries maintain a respective silence. Questions of secondary importance, on the contrary, are not so carefully prepared beforehand, and give the minor plenipotentiaries an opportunity of taking a more active part in the discussion." —The Times, July 5, 1878 (Berlin Correspondence).

"All Friday and Saturday the coryphæes of the Congress devoted themselves to private interviews. Lord Beaconsfield conferred with Count Schouvaloff, Prince Bismarck, and Count Andrassy; Count Schouvaloff spent half a night in solitary conclave with his Vienna colleague, while Prince Bismarck likewise held special conference with the Russian and Austrian plenipotentiaries." *Ibid.*, June 17, 1878 (Berlin Correspondence).

"June 21. Negotiations all day between Schouvaloff, Bismarck, and Beaconsfield. Hope is entertained of some agreement, since the wording of the answer from St. Petersburg was favorable." Hohenlohe, *Memoirs*, II, p. 213.

Russian and British representatives. (Protocols, p. 14.)¹ Even the order in which the questions should be discussed seems to have been fixed by private arrangement among the plenipotentiaries.² The most difficult questions for adjustment came at the beginning and toward the end of the Congress—the questions of Bulgaria and Batoum. Over both the Congress was nigh a rupture, but the pourparlers of the interested plenipotentiaries, aided by the good offices of Bismarck, intervened to effect settlement.³ The Batoum question was rendered all the more

(1) "The Political Correspondence of this evening [June 14] publishes the following: 'The confidential pourparlers which have been carried on since the day before yesterday between the plenipotentiaries in Berlin relates to the question which has once more been mooted, of a simultaneous withdrawal of the British and Russian naval and military forces from the neighborhood of Constantinople. This question will be brought before the Congress on Monday if an understanding is effected in the interval.'" The Times, June 15, 1878, in telegram from Vienna.

(2) "The decision to be come to about the mode of proceeding [order of discussion of questions] may very likely in a great measure depend on the result of the confidential pourparlers going on within the last few days, and in the first instance, of course, on those between Count Andrassy, Lord Beaconsfield, and Count Schouvaloff, at first separately and later on between all three together * * * But although progress is reported, the impression is that things are as yet far from being near a conclusion; and this strengthens the belief that some time will be devoted to further private negotiations before the real business of the Congress begins. The pourparlers now going on between the three powers most closely interested are, in fact, but the continuation of those previously carried on in Vienna and London." The Times, June 17, 1878 (Vienna Correspondence).

"It appears that the confidential pourparlers have already led to an understanding about the mode of proceeding with the discussion of the treaty. The plenipotentiaries, it is said, have decided to avoid anything like a general consideration and enter at once in medias res * * * Bulgaria, with all connected with it, is to have priority of attention." Ibid., June 18, 1878 (Vienna Correspondence).

(3) The following excerpts from The Times correspondence will indicate the nature and the methods of the pourparlers on the Bulgarian question:

"All that can, therefore, be safely assumed, is that the Bulgarian question has formed the main subject of the recent confidential pourparlers and that it has made some progress." Ibid., June 18, 1878 (Vienna Correspondence).

"Yesterday's informal negotiations producing no result, the Bulgarian discussion in to-day's sitting of the Congress likewise left the situation unsolved. Private interviews will be resumed tomorrow." Ibid., June 20, 1878 (Berlin Correspondence).

"The plenipotentiaries of England, Russia, and Austria, in a conference held this evening at 5 o'clock, agreed to the following points, which will be submitted tomorrow to the Congress for ratification * * * Thus tomorrow's sitting will furnish the most delicate task of the Congress * * * A telegram from Constantinople constrained the Russians thus to settle these questions. At the same time this solution is equally due to the personal intervention of Prince Bismarck, who spoke with Lord Beaconsfield to-day." Ibid., June 22, 1878 (Berlin Correspondence).

"The Russian plenipotentiaries, in several official sittings, conferences, and interviews, declaring themselves unable to make the requisite concessions, Lord Beaconsfield at last gave them to understand that if to-day's sitting were allowed to pass without producing any result, he would probably deem it incumbent upon him to leave * * *. In the conference or at the social board, in lobby or at chance meetings in street and park, as often as the important subject was broached, Russian insinuating eloquence encountered the firm front of English resolve." Ibid., June 24, 1878 (Berlin Correspondence of June 22).

"To-day, before the public sitting, there was a long private interview between the plenipotentiaries of Russia, England, and Austria. In this interview, which was held at 11 o'clock, the last points which remained in suspense from the sitting of yesterday were settled, in order that the arrangements arrived at * * * might be laid before the Congress. Doubtless concessions have been made to Russia with which it would have been preferred to dispense." Ibid., June 24, 1878 (Berlin Correspondence).

Protocols reveal little of the negotiations.

Suspension of session.

Definite functions of the plenary congress.

delicate because of the unauthorized publication of the Anglo-Russian Convention of May 30, and it needed all the diplomatic resources of assembled Europe to prevent a break.¹ The protocols, however, in their official formality, reveal little of the atmosphere in which these negotiations were conducted, save that the appeals to the plenipotentiaries to discuss matters in private usually coincided with the periods of tension.² Occasionally, on questions of detail, the plenary session was suspended to permit of agreement by discussion between the representatives of interested powers—for instance, between the Austrians and Russians over the navigation of the Danube (Protocols, p. 186) and between the Russians and the British and Turkish over the demarcation of the Asiatic frontier (*ibid.*, pp. 276–277).

But even after the results of the *pourparlers* had been brought to the Congress, a residuum of discussion often remained, giving to the plenary assembly a definite function in the determination of issues. Details had to be settled and minor differences removed. The full Congress, too, gave the respective parties an opportunity to spar for more favorable positions than they may have happened to hold in the preliminary discussions, or, at the worst, to sound their diplomatic trumpets for the beating of a graceful retreat.³

3. MEDIATION OF "NEUTRAL" POWERS.

The powers represented at the Berlin Congress were not equally interested in its adjustments. On most questions the vital interests of Austria, Great Britain, and Russia were directly affected, while Germany, France, and Italy held the balance and mediated in the

Germany, France, and Italy hold the balance.

(1) Hanotaux, *Contemporary France*, IV, pp. 350–351.

(2) Thus Andrassy on the Batoum question:

"The first Plenipotentiary of Austria, calling to remembrance precedents which have led to good results, believes, with Lord Salisbury, that private interviews between the representatives of the two powers more specially interested might smooth difficulties which still oppose themselves to an understanding on which all his hopes are bent. His Excellency declared that he accepts beforehand the results of the discussion which will be carried on between the two powers." Protocols, p. 208.

The part played by these informal discussions, though many of them are unrecorded, is apparent from a perusal of the official proceedings. See Protocols, pp. 13, 14, 15, 25–26, 38, 46, 50, 66, 93, 151, 156, 183, 199, 207, 208, 209, 225, 238, 277.

³ In such a discussion in full Congress each side in turn may expect to be more favorably situated than in the preliminary conference, * * * as it may chance to carry its point by the support of the other powers who * * * took no active part in them * * *. But even as regards those points about which the preliminary conferences have led to some sort of understanding, it was hardly to be supposed that no effort should be at least made in the full sitting of the Congress to defend them, and, with respect to Russia especially, some defense on the stipulations of San Stefano has to be made, at least for form's sake. The Times, June 19, 1878 (Vienna correspondence.)

disputes.¹ The rôle of the "neutral" powers was thus set forth by Bismarck at the session of June 26: "The states less directly interested in the questions which might trouble the peace of the world are naturally called upon to raise an impartial voice on every occasion when, ^{Their rôle as} for motives which appear of secondary importance in ^{neutral powers.} the eyes of Europe, the pacific object of the meetings of the Congress may be compromised. It is in this sense that France, Italy, and Germany would appeal, if necessary, to the wisdom of those of the friendly powers whose interests are more particularly engaged." (Protocols, p. 90.)

It has been already noticed (*supra*, p. 19) that M. ^{M. Waddington} Waddington was commissioned to draft an agreement ^{drafts} between the British and the Russian positions, which ^{compro-} task he accepted only "as a mission of conciliation." He succeeded, and Bismarck thought it right "in the name of the High Assembly to thank the French plenipotentiaries for the services which they have rendered to the cause of peace in facilitating an understanding by the text which they have just prepared." (*Ibid.*, pp. 50, 77.) At the session of June 25, in the matter of substituting European commissions for Russian commissions during the provisional administration of Bulgaria, Count Corti, ^{Italian} "at the request of the Congress, consents to exam- ^{representative} ine, in concert with the representatives of the three powers more immediately interested, into the modifications to be introduced into the text of the treaty of San Stefano in the sense of Count Andrassy's proposition." ^{re-} As a result of the Italian mediation, the plenipotentiaries ^{medi-} of the interested powers agreed upon a new draft. (*Ibid.*, pp. 79, 93.) Again, in questions relative to the Danube ^{Mediation re} Commission, with respect to which the Russian and the ^{Danube Commis-} Austrian representatives offered divergent proposals, the Congress decided to utilize the mediation of a third power to bring the two texts into accord. For that purpose Baron de Haymerle and M. d'Oubril met the Count de Saint Vallier during a suspension of the sitting and agreed upon an arrangement satisfactory to both parties. (*Ibid.*, pp. 183, 186.)

¹ This, however, is true of Germany only in a qualified sense; for she, too, entered the Congress with a definite, though carefully concealed policy, however Bismarck might asseverate that she was "connected by no direct interests with the matters of the East." He saw to it that Austria secured a field for expansion and at the same time that Great Britain and Russia did not entirely compose their quarrel.

4. THE BOUNDARY COMMITTEE (COMMISSION DE DÉLIMITATION DES FRONTIÈRES).

Boundary questions prominent.

Membership of the committee.

Its functions.

Its relation to the military commission.

Its work as signed by Congress.

Committee asks for Bulgarian question.

Committee resembles the Congress in its deliberations.

As the work of the Congress advanced, it found itself more and more concerned with questions of boundary, and the need of a more expeditious method became apparent. Accordingly, at the the eighth session (June 28), on the proposal of Baron de Haymerle, it was resolved to institute a committee, consisting of one plenipotentiary for each power, to be charged "with formulating and submitting to the Congress a tracing of the frontier," the plenipotentiaries to indicate to the secretariat their choice of delegates. (Protocols, p. 121.) At the next session (June 29) the personnel of the committee was announced and thereafter, until the Congress rose, it was busy almost daily with various and often critical controversies over the delimitation of the boundaries.¹ It was its function to agree as far as possible on details and then to submit its work to the Congress for ratification.² It also directed the work of the Military Commission (see below) whose decisions in turn it usually adopted. From the plenary assembly its reports went to the Drafting Committee to be put into due form for the text of the treaty. While in general, the Congress indicated with what questions the Boundary Committee should deal, in one instance at least (the Bulgarian frontier) the Committee asked that the question, with all its details, be remitted to it for its consideration and decision, which request was complied with by the Congress. (Protocols, pp. 166, 167.)

The Boundary Committee, in its deliberations, naturally reflected the differences, and employed the methods, of the plenary Congress.³ It effected compromises, some-

¹ The boundary committee was as follows: For Germany, Prince Hohenlohe; for Austria, Baron de Haymerle; for France, Count de Saint Vallier; for Great Britain, Lord Odo Russell; for Italy, Count de Launay; for Russia, Count Schouvaloff; for Turkey, Mehemed Ali Pasha. (Protocols, p. 132.) Hohenlohe was chairman.

² "The preliminary deliberations which commenced yesterday under the presidency of Prince Hohenlohe, and which are attended by one representative of each power, will continue to be held. Their object is to prepare the matters which are to come before the full sitting of the Congress, or to a certain extent to settle, as in committee, difficult points which at the full sittings, it would not be easy to dispose of without considerable delay. The arrangement is such that when certain matters have been referred to this committee, the full Congress will be able to continue its labors in regard to other questions, and subsequently take up those which have been submitted to the second plenipotentiaries under the presidency of Prince Hohenlohe." *The Times*, July 1, 1878.

³ The following excerpts will illustrate its methods and difficulties:

"July 1. Sitting of the Committee on the Servian frontier question where we came to no conclusion, since Mehemed Ali made difficulties." Hohenlohe, *Memoirs*, II, p. 219.

"July 4. The commission for the adjustment of the frontiers began its sittings at 12 o'clock yesterday. The Bulgarian frontier was first discussed, and the requisite

times with insufficient data, and was principally concerned with diplomatic settlements, even in defiance of racial or geographical considerations.¹ On occasion, the "neutral" members of the committee were responsible for its decisions, as in the matter of the Asiatic frontier, where the line, an intermediate one between the line asked for by the British and that offered by the Russians "had been adopted by an unanimous vote of the neutral powers." (Dispatch of Salisbury, July 10, 1878, Protocols, p. 213).²

Influence of neutral members.

Usually the reports (especially the majority reports) of the Boundary Committee became the subjects of further discussion in plenary Congress, and, agreement failing there, it once or twice became necessary to empower the Committee to settle a question of detail by majority vote without referring it back to the Congress or to special commissioners. In each case, however, when this was done by the Committee, its decision received the sanction of the full assembly. (Protocols, pp. 230, 239, 241, 251.) In one instance (re the valley of Alach-Kerd in Asia Minor) the Committee confessed that, in the absence of accurate knowledge as to the territory, it could not arrive at a decision, and referred the question to a special military commission to settle the dispute after the congress should rise. (Protocols, p. 269.)

Reports of committee considered by Congress.

Exceptional settlement of question by Committee.

Reference of question to special commission.

instructions were given to Lieut. Col. Blüme for deliberation in the commission of experts. The English difficulties then were mentioned. * * * Ibid.

"July 6. Yesterday at 12 o'clock Delimitation Commission. We made no progress, as the English plenipotentiary was not sufficiently instructed * * *. After the sitting I discussed the Balkan frontier further with Salisbury * * *. I then went to dine with Bülow, and explained to Schouvaloff, who dined there, too, a proposed method of adjusting the differences, which I had meantime thought out. Schouvaloff assented to it, but advised me to defer the proposal until the last moment * * *. At 9.30 there was a long sitting of the Commission, when we again drew up reports * * *." Ibid. p. 221.

"July 7. At the close of the debate I * * * asked the Chancellor to put the Bulgarian frontier question on the order of the day for Monday, since I was reluctantly compelled to say that the Commission could not agree on the subject * * *. I replied that * * * the instructions of individual plenipotentiaries were defective. Odo Russell was naturally angry at this. He said nothing, but after the sitting declared he would take no further part in the sittings of the Commission. But he allowed himself afterwards to be pacified by Schouvaloff." Ibid., p. 222.

¹ "After this sitting [of the Congress] the Delimitation Commission at once held its sitting, in order to smooth the differences of opinion between Gortchakoff and Beaconsfield. After a long search we found a small piece which we could take away from the Russians: some mountain ridges, out of which we made a so-called *ligne de conciliation*, which was then accepted. None of us knew whether it was a sensible frontier." Hohenlohe, op. cit., II, p. 224.

² So, too, over the Sandjak of Sofia:

"The discussion became so warm at one of the last sittings of the commission that Germany, France, and Italy intervened and submitted a compromise boundary, which will probably be adopted by the Commission and Congress." The Times, July 5, 1878 (Berlin Correspondence).

5. MILITARY COMMISSIONS.

As military considerations were of paramount importance in the definition of the frontiers, the Boundary Committee of necessity had to rely for its technical decisions on the military experts attached to the various missions. Hence, many of the issues that divided the Congress were in fact carried over, through the Committee, to its military commissioners, and when these failed to effect settlement, the Committee would report no progress and the controversy have to seek other solution in plenary session.¹ Thus the military commissions played an important, sometimes a decisive part, in the final results and were responsible, in turn, for many of the differences that threatened more than once to render agreement impossible.²

6. THE DRAFTING COMMITTEE (COMMISSION DE RÉDACTION).

Function of the
Drafting Committee.

The proposal for a Drafting Committee was made by Bismarck, in the name of Germany, at the session of June 26. Its function was stated to be "the preparation of a draft of all the stipulations to be inserted in the new treaty, taking into consideration the resolutions recorded in the protocols of the Congress." The proposal was adopted, and the Committee was constituted before the next session (June 28).³ As the language of the treaty was to be French, it was natural that the chairman of the Committee should be the French representative, Desprez.

A French chair-
man.

¹ "Count Schouvaloff [speaking as a member of the Boundary Committee] recalls that the Congress, in one of its first sittings, admitted unanimously that the Sandjak of Sofia should be incorporated into the Principality of Bulgaria, subject to a strategic rectification of its frontiers. When the question was transmitted to the examination of the specialists of all the powers, they understood that it was a question of choosing between several crests those which could be best applicable to the conditions of defense. Such has not been the opinion of the English staff officers: they have asked to put back the frontiers behind the chain of mountains, and have, in this manner, converted a strategic rectification into a territorial cession." *Protocols*, p. 228. See also *The Times*, July 5 and 10, 1878.

² "July 6. * * * At 12 o'clock I found Lieutenant Colonel Blüme in the hall, and he told me that he had arranged nothing with the English general, and that in their special commission they had arrived at no conclusion." *Hohenlohe*, op. cit., p. 221.

³ "July 19. A sitting of the commission on the morning of the 9th to make final settlements of the Servian frontier. We waited a long time for Lieutenant Colonel Blüme, who came at last and brought before us the proposed frontier of Servia. We accepted it by 5 votes to 2, as also the western frontier of Bulgaria." *Ibid.*, p. 224.

"July 10. * * * Preliminary Commission afterwards. We waited for the proposal of the military members, who again quarreled about the strategic position in the valley of Alach-Kerd * * *. Lieutenant Colonel Blüme arrived at last and made his report, whereupon we drew up a resolution." *Ibid.*, p. 225.

⁴ The following were the members of the Drafting Committee: For Germany, Prince Hohenlohe; for Austria-Hungary, Baron Haymerle; for France, M. Desprez; for Great Britain, Lord Odo Russell; for Italy, Count de Lauvay; for Russia, M. d'Oubril; for Turkey, Carathéodory Pasha.

While its chief task was to agree upon a draft of articles previously debated, it sometimes had to consider, in connection with the work of drafting, questions which were passed on to it from the plenary Congress. Thus certain propositions relative to the Roumanian tribute were regarded as outside the business of the Congress and were referred to the Drafting Committee for suitable action. (Protocols, p. 155.) So also with the stipulations respecting the navigation of the Boiana. (Ibid., p. 157). Bismarck occasionally shelved proposals—mostly Turkish—which he did not wish to entertain, by referring them to the Drafting Committee, where they were usually not revived.¹ Although its work was more technical than deliberative, different points of view were sometimes developed in the Committee,² but when reported to the Congress they were not entertained, for Bismarck rigidly insisted upon “the inconvenience which would attend the modification of the resolutions adopted by the Congress and which have formed the basis for the labors of the Drafting Committee.”³

Bismarck uses the committee to shelve proposals.

Differences in committee not entertained in congress.

The Committee made its first report on the draft treaty at the session of July 9. Its plan followed the order of the discussion in the Congress and the reporter, M. Desprez, added that the treaties of Paris of March 30, 1856, and of London of March 13, 1871, were to be maintained “in all of their provisions, which are neither modified nor abrogated by the future treaty.” The

Treaties of Paris and London maintained

¹ “The president states that the Ottoman plenipotentiaries will be able to support these observations later on before the Drafting Committee, to which the report of the Boundary Committee will be referred. * * *,” Protocols, p. 183.

² “July 4. * * * Then at 2 the Report Commission met, which deliberated on the organization of Eastern Roumelia. Protests were raised by the Turkish ambassador, Caratheolory, against the proposal that the governor should be a Christian. But we did not go further into the subject. The negotiations were very tedious. We were not finished until 5 o'clock * * *,” Hohenlohe, *Memoirs*, II, p. 220. See also Protocols, p. 255.

³ “July 12. * * * At 9 o'clock once more Report Commission, which lasted until 12 o'clock. I once more settled a threatening difference of opinion between Russians and English as to the frontiers in Asia.” Hohenlohe, *op. cit.*, II, p. 225.

⁴ Bismarck's ruling on this point was directed chiefly against Turkey. With others he was not so strict; e. g.—

“M. Desprez reads the section on Servia. With respect to the capitalization of the tribute of the principality, Prince Gortchakoff points out the importance of this question, on which the Russian plenipotentiaries would have objections to bring forward. Prince Hohenlohe, the Baron de Haymerle, and M. d'Ounbril having announced, moreover, that they have reserve, in this respect, the votes of their Governments [in the Drafting Committee], the congress decides to place this question on the order of the day for the next sitting.” Protocols, p. 256.

“The president observes that an unanimous decision would be required in order to carry the compulsory redemption of the tribute * * *. His Serene Highness must therefore look upon the question as decided, and the Drafting Committee should suppress the article in its draft relative to the capitalization of Roumanian and Servian tributes.” Ibid., p. 268.

New treaty
takes precedence
over the old
treaties.

objection being raised by Salisbury that such qualification was not specific enough, especially with respect to the Straits. the discussion which followed indicated, in the opinion of the president, that the Congress gave its assent to the plan of the Drafting Committee and that the new treaty was to take precedence of the treaties of Paris, of London, and of San Stefano. (Protocols, p. 242.) At the subsequent sessions the work of the Committee was substantially adopted by the Congress without material change.

AGENCIES USED OR DEVISED.

Machinery used
to apply the
treaty.

The object of the Berlin Congress was to formulate a treaty. Many of its provisions, however, required other means of enforcement than the mere fiat of the high assembly. Some of the necessary instrumentalities were ready to hand; others had to be created. The following were the chief agencies employed:

1. EUROPEAN COMMISSIONS.

Bulgarian and
Roumelian Com-
missions.

Special duties
of the Roumelian
Commission.

These, two in number, were instituted under the treaty of Berlin, one to delimit the Bulgarian frontier (article 2), the other to organize Eastern Roumelia in concert with the Ottoman Porte (article 18). The Roumelian Commission was also to be consulted by the Porte with reference to the reforms promised for the other parts of European Turkey not specially organized under the treaty (article 23).¹

2. CONSULAR COMMISSION.

Consuls dele-
gated *ad hoc*.

Consuls of the signatory powers, together with a Turkish commissioner, were delegated *ad hoc* to assist the Russian commissioner in the provisional administration of Bulgaria. Their powers and methods of procedure were defined in article 6 of the treaty.

3. AMBASSADORIAL CONFERENCE AT CONSTANTINOPLE.

Various func-
tions assigned to
the ambassadors.

The diplomatic representatives of the signatory powers at Constantinople were invested with certain functions arising out of the treaty. They constituted the final appeal in case of disagreement between the Russian or

¹ The European Commission for the delimitation of Bulgaria was also to determine the frontier line of the Dobruja cession to Roumania (article 46).

For references to European Commissions in the discussions of the Congress, see Protocols. pp. 47, 65, 67, 77, 91, 132, 252, 271, 275.

Turkish commissioner in Bulgaria and the Consular delegates (article 6). They were to be informed of the occasions when it was necessary to summon Ottoman troops into Roumelia and were to fix the amount of the Ottoman public debt that Servia and Montenegro were to bear for the new territories assigned to them by the treaty of Berlin (articles 16, 33, 42).¹

4. THE DANUBE COMMISSION.

This had been created under the Treaty of Paris of 1856 and by the Treaty of Berlin was maintained in its functions and "all the treaties, arrangements, acts, and decisions relating to its rights, privileges, prerogatives and obligations" were confirmed (articles 53-56). All acts of Danube Commission confirmed.

5. FINANCIAL COMMISSION.

This was merely a recommendation, inserted in the protocol (No. 18) at the instance of Count Corti, that there be established at Constantinople a commission of specialists "charged to examine into the complaints of the bondholders of the Ottoman debt, and to propose the most efficacious means of satisfying them, as far as it is compatible with the financial situation of the Porte." Recommendation of Count Corti. (Protocols, p. 268.)

6. MEDIATION OF THE POWERS.

In the event of disagreement between Greece and Turkey over the rectification of their frontier, the signatory powers reserved "to themselves to offer their mediation to the two parties to facilitate negotiation." Right to mediate reserved. (Article 24.)

INFORMATION AND TECHNICAL APPARATUS.

In 1878, accurate information on the geographic, racial and social conditions of the Balkans was extremely meager. Little was known of the distribution of popu- Meager knowledge of Balkan conditions.

¹ At the session of July 11 the following draft resolution was unanimously agreed to by the Congress:

"The plenipotentiaries of the powers assembled in Congress at Berlin, moved by the reports which have reached some of them as to the present suffering of the population of the Rhodope and of the neighboring countries, are of opinion that it is desirable to instruct the Ambassadors at Constantinople to come to an agreement with the Sublime Porte for the immediate dispatch of a European Commission charged to verify on the spot the serious nature of the facts, and as far as possible to remedy them."

Bismarck, however, pointed out, with the assent of all, "that the members of the High Assembly, in agreeing to this resolution foreign to the subject of their deliberations, are acting, not as members of the Congress, but as representatives of their respective governments." (Protocols, p. 271.)

Maps inexact
and partisan.

Technical incapacity of plenipotentiaries.

Difficulties in
congress due to
inaccurate data.

The Lazes.

lations, and statistical and ethnographical data were so inexact that maps based upon them and submitted to support the respective contentions were characterized as "new instruments of diplomatic warfare," which did "more honor to the patriotic zeal than the scientific accuracy of those who construct them." (*The Times*, June 27, 1878. *Berlin Correspondence*.)¹ Added to lack of information was the incapacity of the chief plenipotentiaries to deal with questions calling for even elementary technical knowledge. Schouvaloff has affirmed that Gortchakoff "was incapable of pointing out on the map, even approximately, the different countries of the Balkan peninsula or * * * the position of Kars and Batoum," while Salisbury asserted that Beaconsfield had never seen a map of Asia Minor; and yet it was they who negotiated the agreement with respect to the Asiatic frontier.² This amazing ignorance of necessary geographical data, as Hohenlohe has recorded, affected even the Boundary Committee, though not to the same degree. (See *supra*, p. 31.)³

Difficulties repeatedly arose in plenary Congress from this source.⁴ During the controversy over Batoum, Gortchakoff estimated the Laze population of Lazistan at 50,000, the British and Turkish plenipotentiaries, at four times that number (*Protocols*, p. 209), which difference had to be reconciled in private interviews. When the Sandjak of Sofia was under final consideration, it was admitted that the map employed was not one upon which to base definite decisions.⁵ And during

¹ "The only sure practical conclusion which can be drawn * * * is that we have as yet very little trustworthy information concerning the population of the Balkan peninsula. This important fact has been fully recognized by the plenipotentiaries, and the Congress has thereby acquired a certain latitude in determining the frontiers of the various units of which Turkey in Europe is henceforth to be composed." *The Times*, June 27, 1878. (*Berlin Correspondence*.)

² *Souvenirs of P. Schouvaloff* quoted in Hanot-Aux, *Contemporary France*, IV, p. 353-354. The complete citation throws an interesting sidelight on the methods of negotiation at the congress. See Appendix III.

³ See also *Protocols*, p. 269.

⁴ "July 9. * * * In the case of Servia the Commission was not agreed. We had to bring the question before the full meeting. Some natural confusion resulted. The Chancellor and the meeting had no idea what the point at issue was, and however clearly I repeatedly explained the matter, the questions, when it came to voting, were not always clearly put. The Commission was finally instructed to deliberate once more on Branja, and once more to report progress." Hohenlohe, *Memoirs*, II, p. 223.

⁵ "The president is of opinion that it is dangerous to lay down in a treaty article a military route on ground which is little known and on a map the accuracy of which can not be relied upon. This delimitation might be inconvenient to those who may make use of it. His Serene Highness * * * is of the opinion that, in accordance with the decisions * * * taken by the Congress, the delimitation should be dealt with by negotiations on the spot." *Protocols*, p. 275.

an earlier discussion of this same question, the continued existence of the Congress was imperiled because of the discovery by the English plenipotentiaries that, through reliance upon an inaccurate map, they had conceded more than they had intended.¹

The best authority on the ethnography of the Balkans at the time appears to have been Kiepert, whose work in German, according to Avril, was "neither complete nor free from error."² For descriptive accounts of Bulgaria and Servia the works of Kanitz were available, and for the Dobrudja that of Peters, all in German. The best history of Bulgaria was by Jericek in Czechish, of which a German translation had been made. Among the statistical compendiums from various sources, the Vienna correspondence of *The Times* commends that of Teploff, a Russian, which seems to have been much relied on by Turkey in its case against the treaty of San Stefano (*The Times*, June 21, 1878).³ The *Times* also speaks of a recent ethnographical map edited by Carl Sax, the Austrian consul at Adrianople, and published by the Geographical Institute of Vienna as "a valuable addition to the data at the disposal of the Congress." This was a more scientific work than its predecessors and had taken into account not only local differences of race and religion, but also the amalgamations that had been effected between various elements (*The Times*, June 21, 1878). Whether or not it was used to any extent does not appear from the record.

Authorities:
Kiepert.

Kanitz.

Jericek.

Teploff.

Sax.

In defining boundaries in the Balkans the maps of the Austrian General staff were followed. (Treaty of Berlin, articles 2, 14, 28, 36.) A note appended to the draft treaty indicated that all the names of places had been

Austrian maps
used.

Russian maps
inaccurate.

¹ "July 4. * * * In the Congress Beaconsfield and Salisbury had agreed that Bulgaria should have the Sandschak of Sofia. They afterwards found that the Sandschak extends far beyond the spurs of the Balkan and that they had conceded too much. They now wish to take that back again, and were quite unabashed. Schouvaloff protested * * *." Hohenlohe, *Memoirs*, II, pp. 219-220.

² Avril, *Negociations relatives au traite de Berlin*, p. 318.

³ "The ethnographic information which we have (of Bulgaria) is not authentic; it is incomplete. The best, with which we are the least familiar, is supplied by German hands in the Kiepert maps * * *." Kohl, *Reden des Fursten Bismarck*, VII, p. 83.

⁴ "The *Golos* of to-day publishes the French text received from Constantinople of the ethnographical protest of the Porte against the Bulgarian frontiers as fixed by the treaty of San Stefano. The *Golos* states that the document which will be submitted to the Congress by the Turkish plenipotentiaries is based upon Teploff's Russian statistical work upon Bulgaria, but points out that the statistics given by Teploff are incorrectly quoted by the compilers of the Turkish protest." *The Times*, June 24, 1878 (Telegram from St. Petersburg).

taken from the Austrian Staff map, but it was not considered advisable that such statement appear in the treaty. As the explanation, however, was "very important," Bismarck was of opinion that it should be mentioned in the protocol. (Protocols, p. 276.) For the frontiers of Asia-Minor Russian maps chiefly were used, but contributed little to exact knowledge of the territory, the Boundary Committee confessing in one instance that they did not have the "maps and documents necessary to enable them to come to any decision." (Protocols, p. 269.)¹

PRINCIPLES APPLIED.

Strategical rectification of frontiers.

Principle of nationality ignored.

British Government noncommittal in Parliament.

Gortchakoff puts forward principle of "majority of populations."

From what has been already indicated, the principle underlying the work of the Congress will be easily apparent—that of "strategical rectification of frontiers" without any necessary regard to racial affiliations or national aspirations.² Nationality as a principle found little, if any, sincere support from the great powers, but was confined for its expression to the pious wishes of the smaller nations admitted by the grace of the Congress to state their claims or to the futile appeals of the Turkish plenipotentiaries.³ In Parliament, the opposition tried to secure from the British Government a pledge that the Balkan settlement should be made not on the basis of "dynastic arrangements or geographical puzzles," but on the just principle of nationalities; but the Government refused to make any definite engagement.⁴ Gortchakoff, in his note communicated to Salisbury, April 13, 1878, had advocated "majority of populations," as the prin-

¹ "The maps of that part of Armenia are so inaccurate and contradictory that it is difficult to settle the frontiers from here." Hübenlohe, *Memoirs*, p. 224.

² At the session of June 17, Salisbury made the following observations:

"* * * It is our task to replace her [Turkey], not upon the footing of her former independence, for it would be impossible entirely to annihilate the results of the war, but to restore to her a relative independence which shall permit her efficaciously to protect the strategical, political and commercial interests of which she is to remain the guardian * * *."

"England has never admitted * * * that it was necessary, in order to guarantee the populations of European Turkey against the abuses of the Government and against oppression, to detach them from the political supremacy of the Porte. This guarantee, which is to be of the very highest importance, requires rather the reform of the internal administration than a political separation." Protocols, p. 24.

³ See the address of M. Delyannis, the Greek Minister for Foreign Affairs before the Congress on June 29, and those of the Roumanian delegates on July 1. Protocols, pp. 133-134, 151-153.

⁴ The first Ottoman plenipotentiary argues against the cession of Antivari to Monte negro. The Porte would have no objection to Spizza, but she maintains that Antivari belongs to the Albanians, and that the Montenegrins would only be able to dwell there by force, against the wish of the population." Protocols, p. 156.

⁵ Consult the debates on the supplementary estimate, Jan. 31-Feb. 7, 1878 (*Hansard-Parliamentary Debates*, 3d ser., vol. 237, pp. 729-1313 *passim*), especially the speech of Sir William Vernon Harcourt (*ibid.*, pp. 1114-1130). See Appendix IV.

eiple to govern. "Nothing," he maintained, "more equitable or rational could be imagined."¹ So, too, argued the Turks at the Congress, but to no purpose.² The policy that was to control was set forth in Salisbury's instructions to Lord Odo Russell of June 8, 1878:

"In the judgment of Her Majesty's Government, it [Bulgaria] should not be allowed to extend south of the Balkan range * * *. Great care * * * should be taken that while every necessary safeguard is provided for the good government of the population, the political and military authority of the Sultan's Government is sufficiently secured to provide against the risk of this province being made the field of treasonable intrigue or the gate of an invading army * * *. It is very important for the security of Constantinople that they [the Turks] should continue to occupy the passes of the Balkans."³

British Government against extension of Bulgaria south of Balkans.

This policy of strategical and political considerations was early adopted by the Congress, nominally at the instance of Austria, in reality on the insistence of Great Britain, and every page of the protocols testifies to its triumph.⁴ Bismarck lost no opportunity to promote it and of all the representatives at the Congress he was most out of sympathy with the national aspirations of the small peoples. He opposed the admission of the Roumanian delegates, whose claims did not seem to him "of a nature to facilitate a good understanding," and supported Russia on the question of Bessarabia

Policy of strategic frontiers triumphant at Congress.

Bismarck not in sympathy with small peoples. Opposes Roumania.

¹ British and Foreign State Papers, vol. 69, p. 817.

Thus also Gortchakoff at the Congress:

"Distributions of territory, proposed without regard to the principle of the majority of the population might be suggested not by considerations of race, but by particular views of political, geographical, or commercial interest. Russia having, as far as she herself is concerned, no material advantage to seek in these countries, can only estimate these various propositions from one point of view, viz., that of equity and conciliation, to which she is always inclined, with a view to the consolidation of an European agreement and of general peace." Protocols, p. 36. See also *ibid.*, pp. 24-25.

"* * * The Quadrilateral [should] be left in a military sense at least in their [Turkish] possession—a thing they deem themselves all the more entitled to, as there can not be the least doubt that the majority of the population thereabouts is Mohammedan. They think that while thus shaping out the new Bulgaria more in conformity with the principle of race they might have a far better line of defense than if the Balkan, were chosen as such." The Times, June 20, 1878. (Vienna Correspondence.)

³ British and Foreign State Papers, vol. 69, pp. 834-835.

"Moreover, a point which will avert many difficulties has been obtained by Austria. It has been thoroughly agreed that questions of strategic interest shall have precedence over all ethnographical considerations, so long used in the Eastern Question to suit the fancies of ambitious persons. As soon as the settlement of any matter is arrived at, the putting of it into execution will be primarily determined by officers from a thoroughly strategical point of view * * *. In this way the line round Sofia is considerably reduced, whereas on ethnographical grounds it would have been much more extended and might have menaced the road from Salonica." The Times, June 21, 1878. (Berlin Correspondence). See also The Times, July 1, 1878.

(Protocols, pp. 135-138). He was careful to impress upon the Congress that the privileges accorded to the Greek representatives were strictly limited (*ibid.* p. 38). The proposal of Salisbury that the Armenian question should be given its day in court produced in the Chancellor a notable burst of impatience,¹ while his indifference to the ultimate welfare of the Balkans was only exceeded by his studied incivility toward the Turks.²

To state it exactly, however, no power maintained any one principle consistently throughout, but took its position on each question according to its particular concept of diplomatic expediency. Thus Great Britain, insisting upon strategic frontiers in the delimitation of Bulgaria, urged ethnographical considerations for the Greeks and for Batoum (Protocols, pp. 22, 24, 208), although, in the case of Greece, these arguments were not pursued by the British plenipotentiaries with especial zeal, the Greeks being told by Beaconsfield that "states, like individuals, which have a future, are in a position to wait" (*ibid.*, p. 198). Russia, on the other hand, loud in her professions of respect for the principle of nationality, had defied it in the treaty of San Stefano and played counter to it when her vital interests were involved at Berlin, especially in the cessions of Bessarabia and Batoum.³ Of the interested great powers, Austria came nearest to a uniform policy. According to Hohenlohe, Andrassy told Waddington that he "must occupy Bosnia and Herzegovina at any price" (Memoirs, II, p. 213).

Limits of privileges of the Greeks.

Impatient with Armenian question.

Indifferent to Balkan States.

No power maintained consistency of principle.

Great Britain supports nationality for Greeks and Batoum.

Russia defies it in Bessarabia and Batoum.

Austria's policy — occupation of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

¹ "Lord Salisbury announced a proposal as to the Armenians which brought the remark, '*Encore un de plus!*' from the Chancellor." Hohenlohe, *Memoirs*, p. 230.

"The President observes that it is, perhaps, difficult to carry out repressive measures among independent tribes, and His Serene Highness raises doubts as to the practical efficacy of the article proposed by Lord Salisbury." Protocols, p. 210.

² "His Serene Highness thinks that the Congress is not in a position to find a remedy for all these dangers. If the Bulgarian population, either through ill will or innate incapacity, can not make their new institutions work, Europe will in truth be obliged to take counsel, but later on and when that time shall have arrived * * *. To take into consideration contingent questions relative to the future of Bulgaria, which interests Germany and doubtless some of the Powers here represented, only in view of the question of the general peace, would be to extend the task of the Congress beyond its limits." Protocols, p. 64.

Hohenlohe, commenting on this "attack * * * on the peoples of the Balkan peninsula," says that the Chancellor "was quite indifferent to the fate of these peoples." *Memoirs*, II, p. 215.

³ "It is thought this evening that the question of the Lazes has a more serious import than was generally believed * * *. The Russians object to a war-like population sheltered by mountains just without their new possession." *The Times*, July 8, 1878 (Berlin correspondence).

"Batoum had not surrendered, nor was it handed over to the Russians till September 6, 1878, after protests on the part of the population, which at one time threatened serious consequences." T. E. Holland, *Studies in International Law*, p. 244.

For a fuller discussion of nationality and the Batoum frontier, see Appendix V.

But her designs went further. She was out to curb the vigorous young peoples just beginning to realize statehood,¹ and in this she succeeded, thanks to the forward-looking policy of Bismarck and the near-sighted acquiescence of Great Britain. But Austria's aim, as expressed in the language of her first plenipotentiary, appeared unimpeachable. It was to create a "state of affairs which shall give the greatest possible chance of duration and stability." (Protocols, p. 48.) How durable and how stable, the Bosnian coup of 1908 and the tragedy of Serajevo grimly attest!

To sum up, the Congress, through those controlling its decisions, was animated by but two considerations: (1) That collective Europe alone can dignify claims of nationality with recognition,² and (2) that, in the words of Beaconsfield at the sitting of June 22, "it remains established, in fact, by unanimous assent, that the Sultan, as a member of the political body of Europe, is to enjoy a position which shall secure to him the respect of his sovereign rights." (Protocols, p. 43.)³

Curbs Serbia and Montenegro.

Two controlling considerations:
1. Sanction of European concert.
2. Preservation of Ottomans over-
eignty.

GENERAL CONDUCT OF BUSINESS.

From the technical point of view the Congress of Berlin was a model of orderly procedure and definite results. The personality of Bismarck, then in the vigor of his intellectual powers, gave to the deliberations a direction which made for accurate, pertinent, and summary business arrangements. The Chancellor, however, was in ill health at the time, and for that reason a somewhat rapid *tempo*, if not outright impatience, may be detected,

The congress a model technically.

Business direction given by Bismarck.

Occasional haste, due to Bismarck's ill health.

¹ "June 19. Blowitz came to me this morning. He said he was beginning to be uneasy about the result of the Congress. Austria was showing more determination and resolution than he had hitherto credited her with. She did not at all wish that Montenegro should be allowed to receive Antivari, and that the Serbs, with Bosnia and Montenegro, should proclaim an empire under Nikita * * *. Austria wishes * * * to be forced to invade those countries * * *." Hohenlohe, *Memoirs*, II, p. 212.

² "Prince Bismarck observes that the question is whether or not the powers are agreed to recognize the independence of Roumania * * *. Europe alone has the power to sanction independence. She has then to ask herself under what conditions she will adopt that important decision, and if she considers that these conditions shall be the same as those already established by the Congress in the case of Servia." Protocols, p. 153.

³ Beaconsfield elaborated this point of view at the session of July 5, in part, as follows:

"His Excellency, seeking for the motives of this attitude [the expectant attitude of Greece] thinks that it should be attributed to the false idea that was formed, after the conclusion of the treaty of San Stefano, as to the principles which should guide the Congress. An erroneous opinion attributed to the Congress the intention to proceed to the partition of a worn-out state (*etat vieilli*), and not to strengthen, as the high assembly has done, an ancient empire which it considers essential to the maintenance of peace. It is true that often after a great war, territorial rearrangements are brought about * * *. The word "partition" can not be applied to such arrangements and retrocessions, and the Greek Government was entirely mistaken as to the views of Europe * * *." Protocols, p. 197.

even in the colorless statements of the protocols.¹ At the sixth session, Bismarck, urging the Congress to avoid discussion of details, alluded to "the state of his health, which will not permit of his assisting at many more meetings" (Protocols, p. 79), and during the *pourparlers* over Batoum he flatly announced that if a settlement was not arrived at in 24 hours, he would leave for the more restful atmosphere of Kissingen.²

Danger of withdrawal of power from the Congress.

Attitude of Austria.

Disraeli's *coup*.

Disclosure of secret agreements.

One consideration gave Bismarck pause and set a limit to his complete domination of the Congress. In the background there was always looming up the possible withdrawal of one or more of the powers and the consequent rupture of the negotiations. Here the British plenipotentiaries had the weather gage. Austria might wish to employ that stratagem, but, in the opinion of competent observers, would not have taken the initiative herself. Great Britain, however, was prepared to follow a line of her own.³ During the discussions on Bulgaria, the British plenipotentiaries presented a virtual ultimatum of four points, which the Russians took as a referendum. Meanwhile, having concluded that Russia could not yield the points, Disraeli had decided to leave the Congress and had gone to the length of ordering by telegram a special train from Cologne. Bismarck heard of it, promptly intervened with a personal call at Beaconsfield's hotel, and at the next session the surrender of Russia was complete.⁴

Other difficulties beset the Congress, but Bismarck met them all. The disclosure of secret agreements, especially the Anglo-Russian convention of May 30, had such a reaction in Great Britain, and so directly affected the position of the British plenipotentiaries at the Congress,

¹ "July 5. * * * This impatience on the part of the chancellor, which is justified by his state of health, accelerates the work, but its disadvantages will be felt later, since much will only be superficially settled. I should prefer slower work." Hohenlohe, *Memoirs*, II, pp. 220-221.

² Hanotaux, *Contemporary France*, IV, p. 354.

³ "June 19. Blowitz came to me this morning. He said he was beginning to be uneasy about the result of the Congress * * *. It might * * * happen that Austria became dissatisfied and might contemplate the possibility of leaving the Congress. But she did not wish to act thus alone, and had therefore sounded England to see if she also was prepared to retire from the Congress in case the necessary concessions in Bulgaria were not made her. The Englishmen had not answered that. Blowitz thought it would be a very good thing if the Englishmen's demands were satisfied, for then there would be a certainty that Austria would not by herself abandon the Congress. England, however, whether she was left alone or was dissatisfied, would not be in the least perturbed at the idea of abandoning the Congress alone." Hohenlohe, *Memoirs*, II, p. 212.

⁴ For the authentic account of this incident, see A. N. Cumming, *Secret History of the Berlin Treaty*, in *Nineteenth Century and After*, vol. 58 (1905), pp. 83-60. This is a transcript of a conversation with Lord Rowton (Montagu Corry), who attended the Congress as Disraeli's private secretary. See Appendix VI.

that it required all the skill at the command of the Chancellor to secure a compromise and avoid a break.¹

Then there was the personal equation. Gortchakoff was ill, vain, and fond of attention, Disraeli, quizzical and inclined to pose. Feeling showed itself at times, even between members of the same delegation.² Bismarck, however, played upon them all with a sure touch.³ Even their differences were sometimes fomented by the Chancellor "in order to have the pleasure of arranging them." But he always kept his eye on a settlement. Bismarck wished for peace at the time, having already secured what he had designed to get by the sword. Thus, while he put Russia "on the stool of repentance" he aimed not to make reconciliation with Germany impossible. France he treated with courteous consideration.³ Great Britain was given a dignified, if frigid, respect. Only the Turks met with uniform rebuff, having on most questions, in Bismarck's view, "neither an opinion to offer nor a decision to take in Congress." (Protocols, p. 270.)⁴

Influence of personality.

Bismarck desirous for peace.

His treatment of the powers.

But with all his gruff imperiousness, Bismarck showed tact in the essentials and it was due to his keen instinct for the conduct of affairs and his profound knowledge of human nature that the Congress was carried to a successful issue. The plenipotentiaries may have played at real

Bismarck's tact and practicality.

¹ See Hanotaux, op. cit., IV, pp. 350-351.

² "June 25. Schuwaloff told me before yesterday's sitting he had on the day before prevented a telegram from Gortchakoff being sent, in which the latter wished to state to the Emperor of Russia that he was ill, and could not therefore accept the responsibility for the last resolutions. Schuwaloff declared that, if this telegram went, he would telegraph to the Emperor asking him to send another plenipotentiary. The telegram was therefore stopped." Hohenlohe, *Memoirs*, II, p. 215.

"July 5. * * * Haymerle reported on the frontiers of Montenegro. In this connection he read a printed list of the various points, which was incomplete. St. Vallier called his attention to the defect. Andrassy was indignant that his Austrian colleague should have made himself ridiculous, and muttered some uncomplimentary remark * * *." *Ibid.*, p. 220.

³ Thus Schuwaloff writes of him:

"Prince Bismarck presided over the Congress with a certain military brusqueness of manner which did not displease those present and which the representatives of all the Powers took in good part, the two English Ministers not excepted, from whom I had awaited more haughtiness." (Cited in Hanotaux, op. cit., p. 347.)

And Carathéodory Pasha remembers him with reason, as follows:

"The Congress of Berlin was completely dominated by Prince Bismarck * * *. The confidence and fear that he inspired were general * * *. Long accustomed to the most complete independence, he looked upon the slightest observation as a desire for resistance which he hastened to suppress with nervous impatience and a will of iron." Cited *ibid.*

"His incontestable superiority, the awe that he inspired amongst the be-medaled and be-ribboned dignitaries that surrounded him, ought to have made him more indulgent. The individualities of these lofty personages aroused his formidable criticism. Beaconsfield was not spared any more than was Gortchakoff. He only mocked at their solemn methods of procedure, their romantic and slightly old-fashioned ways." *Ibid.*, p. 353.

⁴ See also Hohenlohe, *Memoirs*, II, pp. 209-210.

business, but the correct forms and formulas were carefully observed. In the outward unanimity and technical precision of the Berlin Congress the European Concert achieved its masterpiece.

THE QUESTION OF GUARANTEES.

Sanction for the treaty.

Gortchakoff's declaration.

At Berlin, as always in great international settlements, a sanction for the execution of the negotiated treaty had to be considered by the plenipotentiaries. It was brought before the Congress in a direct way by Prince Gortchakoff at the session of July 8, in a formal declaration expressing the wish that the work, "wrought in a spirit of conciliation, may secure to Europe a solid and durable peace." After pointing out Russia's special interest in preventing the recurrence of periodic crises in eastern Europe, the First Plenipotentiary of Russia asked the Congress "by what principle and in what manner it proposes to insure the execution of its high decision."¹ This communication was placed on the order of the day for the next session (July 9), but discussion on that occasion was adjourned until a definite proposal had been formulated by the Russian delegation as follows:

Russian proposal for guarantees.

"Europe having given her most solemn and binding sanction to the stipulations of the Treaty of Berlin, the High Contracting Parties regard the totality of the articles of the present act as forming a combination of stipulations the execution of which they engage to control and superintend, while insisting on their being carried out entirely in conformity with their intentions.

"They reserve to themselves the right to come to an understanding, in case of need, as to the requisite means to insure a result which neither the general interests of Europe nor the dignity of the Great Powers permit them to leave invalid." Protocols, p. 253.²

¹ "Russia is especially interested in this. She has made great sacrifices during the war; she has made considerable ones with a view to the reestablishment of peace and of the maintenance of the good understanding of Europe. She has the right to expect that at any rate these sacrifices shall not be made gratuitously, and that the work of which they have laid the foundations shall not be fruitless, through want of execution, as have been the previous attempts at pacification in the East * * *. The plenipotentiaries of Russia are persuaded that this thought is shared equally by the High Assembly, and that it would not raise an ephemeral structure which would expose the peace of the East and of Europe to fresh dangers." Protocols, p. 232.

² "Lord Salisbury having asked whether the terms of this proposition imply the necessity of employing a foreign force in case the treaty be not carried into effect, the President declares that in his opinion this could not be the case. In the opinion of the President, the Powers engage themselves only to an active superintendence, to be followed, in case of need, by diplomatic action. The second part of the document reserves, it is true, to the Powers the faculty of coming to an understanding as to the means of ulterior action, but, at the same time, without imposing any obligation on any of them." Ibid, p. 253.

Considerable debate over this formula submitted by Gortchakoff took place at the sitting of July 10, but its real consideration went over to the following session (July 11). The differences of opinion were fundamental. Carathéodory thought that sufficient sanction had been already created in the shape of European commissions. For the rest, the execution of the stipulations should be made to depend upon the bona fides of the signatory powers. Under the Russian proposal, the Porte would find itself obliged "to admit within its limits the control of other states, and in turn to exercise a control in other states having the same engagements" (Protocols, p. 265)—obligations too "novel and weighty" for the Turkish Government to assume. The Russian delegation, in support of the proposal, saw "nothing but good in surrounding with every guarantee of efficacy a treaty concluded by the most eminent statesmen in Europe," and "had solely in view the maintenance of the dignity of the European stipulations." (Protocols, pp. 239-240, 253.) Salisbury was against the insertion of such a declaration in the treaty, and knew "of no sanction more 'solemn' and 'binding' than the signature of his Government," for which reason he proposed not to accept an engagement which appeared to him "either to be useless * * * or to have a signification of too undefined a bearing." (Ibid., p. 265.) The same objections, in more elaborated argument, were urged by Waddington, who feared that the clauses of the treaty might become, "under the action of a control decreed by the Congress, a series of pretexts for an incessant interference in all the acts of the Sublime Porte." (Ibid., p. 266.)¹

Differences of opinion.

Carathéodory finds sanction in bona fides of powers.

Russian delegation would reinforce the treaty.

Salisbury considers proposal useless or vague.

Waddington sees danger of incessant interventions.

Andrassy thought the proposal of Gortchakoff should be abbreviated. The second paragraph, in his opinion, "might be interpreted as a want of confidence on the part of the Congress in the result of its labors," and, in the sense of his criticism, he offered an amendment.² Bismarck, while giving, along with the other German plenipotentiaries, the only vote in favor of the Russian

Andrassy offers amendment.

Bismarck against obligatory use of force.

¹ "July 12. * * * Full meeting at 2 o'clock. The proposal of Gortchakoff as to a formal and grandiloquent concluding paragraph was negatived. Gortchakoff was much annoyed. Waddington remarked, with his customary *bon sens*: 'Either it is verbiage, in which case the article is superfluous, or it has some meaning—then it is dangerous.' " Hohenlohe, *Memoirs*, II, p. 225.

² Andrassy's amendment was as follows:

"The high contracting powers look upon the totality of the articles of the present act as forming a collection of stipulations, of which they undertake to control and to superintend the execution." Protocols, pp. 264-265.

proposal (as modified by Schouvaloff), had, on the occasion of Gortchakoff's earlier declaration, crystallized the opinion of the Congress against any sanction implying the obligatory use of force on the part of each state separately. On the other hand, on his view of it, "if the powers engaged themselves jointly to use force at need, they would risk the provocation among themselves of grave disunion."¹ He merely contented himself with having no objection to the recognition, in a special article, that "the powers may reserve to themselves the right to control by their agents the execution of the resolutions of the high assembly." (Protocols, p. 240.)

Approves reservation of right to control.

Proposal and amendment defeated.

Both the Russian proposal and the Austrian amendment failed to secure the assent of the Congress. The results, consequently, of the discussions thereon were, as stated by Bismarck and entered on the protocol, "the proposal itself, the answer of the Porte, and the decisions of the Congress to take note of the declarations of the First Ottoman Plenipotentiary." (Protocols, p. 267.)

SIGNATURE, RATIFICATION AND COMMUNICATION OF TREATY.

Signing of treaty.

The concluding session of the Congress was devoted to the signing of the treaty. All the plenipotentiaries were present, in uniform, and each signed seven copies, which had been prepared. But inasmuch as it is ratification, not signature, of a treaty that gives it validity, the question had arisen at the session of July 12, "in what form and at what date the treaty shall be communicated to the states concerned who have not taken part in the Congress." The sense of the discussion was that official communication could not be made until after exchange of ratifications, which was to take place "within three weeks, or sooner if possible." It was thought advisable, however, that these states should at once be informed of the arrangements affecting them, and, accordingly, the president was authorized "to make known, after the

¹ "Prince Bismarck does not believe that it is possible to find a formula which would guarantee Europe absolutely against the recurrence of those matters which have disturbed her. * * *

"The Congress can perform only a human work, subject, like every other, to the fluctuation of events * * *. Prince Bismarck does not think that beforehand the Congress can be supposed to imagine that the resolutions, taken solemnly, by all Europe united, would not be executed. It would be necessary to wait for an infraction in order to take notice of it, and in this case the powers, warned by their representatives at Constantinople, could arrange to appeal to new diplomatic assemblies." Protocols, p. 240.

signature, to the States interested, the decisions which concerned them in an authentic draft, but communicated in an unofficial form." (Protocols, p. 277.) The complete treaty was transmitted to them, officially, after ratifications had been exchanged.

Other states informed unofficially before.
Officially after ratification.

The final act in the negotiations was effected at Berlin, August 3, 1878, in a *proces-verbal* recording the exchange and signed by the representatives of the signatory powers accredited to the Court of Berlin, or by secretaries authorized to sign *ad hoc*.¹ The Turkish instruments of ratification had not arrived, but the Turkish ambassador announced that his Government had ratified and that he would be prepared to make the exchange for Turkey within 15 days. When this was done in good and due form, the labors of the Berlin Congress were officially at an end.²

Proces - verbal recording exchange of ratifications, August 3, 1878.

¹ For the *proces-verbal*, see British and Foreign State Papers, vol. 69, p. 768.

² "Each diplomatic representative received a copy of this *proces-verbal* in which his sovereign was named first and his own signature attached first, the others being placed in the alphabetical order of the countries represented, according to the French language." Satow, Diplomatic Practice, II, p. 253.

APPENDIX I.

REPRESENTATION AND PERSONNEL OF THE CONGRESS OF BERLIN.

GERMANY.

Plenipotentiaries.—Prince Bismarck, Under-Secretary of State von Bülow, Ambassador Prince Hohenlohe-Schillingfürst.

Secretaries.—Privy Councillor of Legation Bücher, Envoy von Radowitz, Councillors of Legation Busch, and Baron Holstein, Secretaries of Legation Von Bülow, Count Herbert Bismarck, Count Rantzan, Lieut.-Col. Blühme of the Prussian General Staff.

AUSTRIA.

Plenipotentiaries.—Count Andrassy, Ambassador Count Karolyi, Privy Councillor Baron Haymerle.

Secretaries.—Chief of Section Baron Schwegel, Envoy Herr von Teschenberg, Councillors Baron Hübner, Von Kosiek, Doczy, Von Ascher, Secretary Von Peschy, Councillor of Embassy Baron von Mayr, Councillor of Legation Baron Pasette.

FRANCE.

Plenipotentiaries.—M. Waddington, Ambassador Comte de St. Vallier.

Secretaries.—M. Despres,¹ Director of Political Affairs of the Foreign Office; M. Duclerc, Assistant Division Chief; Secretaries of Embassy, Comte de Moüy, Fourchon, Paul Despres de la Motte, Attachés Comte Montalivet, Viscount de Beaucaire, M. Darmet.

GREAT BRITAIN.

Plenipotentiaries.—Lord Beaconsfield, Marquis of Salisbury, Lord Odo Russell.

Secretaries.—Mr. Montagu Corry, Mr. Philip Currie, Mr. Henry Neville Dering, Mr. Hertslet, Mr. Algernon Turnor, Mr. Austin Lee, Hon. J. Bertie, Hon. Eric Barrington, Mr. Chas. Hopwood, Mr. E. Le Marchant Gosselin, Mr. Arthur Balfour, Lieut. Gen. Sir Lintorn Simmons, Capt. Edwards, Capt. Ardagh, Capt. Fitz-George, Lord Cranborne, Mr. E. B. M. Mallet.

¹M. Deprez was not a secretary, as The Times here states, but Third French Plenipotentiary. See *supra*, p. 9, note 1.

ITALY.

Plenipotentiaries.—Count Corti, Ambassador Count Launay.

Secretaries.—Councillors of Embassy Curtopassi and Chevalier Tosi, Secretaries Marquis Bialbi, Marquis de Malaspina.

RUSSIA.

Plenipotentiaries.—Prince Gortchakoff, Ambassador Count Schouvaloff, Ambassador Baron d'Oubril.

Secretaries.—Privy Councillor Baron Jomini, Councillor of State Baron Fredericks, Secretary of Legation Count Adlerberg, Councillors Sorokine and Ivanoff of the Asiatic Department of the St. Petersburg Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Gen. Anjutschin, Colonels Bobrikoff and Bogoluboff.

TURKEY.

Plenipotentiaries.—Alexander Carathéodory Pasha, Ambassador Sadoullah Bey, Gen. Mehemet Ali Pasha.

Secretaries.—Parnies Effendi, Councillor to the Minister of Foreign Affairs; Feridoun Bey, Division Chief of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs; Secretary of Embassy Ohan Bagdadlian, Matchik Effendi, Navum Effendi, Division Chief of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs; Col. Izzet Bey, Mr. Parnis, an English jurist.

(From The Times, June 13 and 14, 1878.)

APPENDIX II.

DEBATE IN THE HOUSE OF LORDS, MARCH 11, 1878, ON THE PRESIDENCY OF THE PROPOSED CONGRESS.

Earl Stanhope in rising, according to notice, to ask the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, whether, in the event of the ensuing conference taking place at Berlin, he will urge that under no circumstances is it desirable that the representative of either of the belligerents should preside, said:

My Lords, I am aware that it is the general practice, when a conference or a congress takes place abroad, that the representative of the country in which the congress is held should preside. We have heard that the coming conference—if it is to be held at all—will take place at Berlin. It follows, therefore, that Prince Bismarck will preside. My Lords, I saw on Thursday last in the *Allgemeine Zeitung* a statement to the effect that the condition of the Prince's health is such that he is not likely to fulfil this arduous duty; and, in that case, supposing he does not, what will happen? I think, my Lords, it is possible—nay, even likely—that the senior representative of the great powers, Prince Gortchakoff, the senior in age, and therefore in experience, may be called upon to take the chair. I might be told this is most unlikely; but when we consider how long and intimate a friendship has existed between the German Chancellor and Prince Gortchakoff—an intimacy commencing 28 years ago at Frankfurt—when one reflects how it has produced the most tremendous results which have ever altered the map of Europe, it is very important that some attempts should be made to avert such a contingency. (*Hansard, Parliamentary Debates, 3d ser., vol. 238, pp. 1036-1037.*)

The Earl of Derby:

* * * My noble friend is no doubt aware that generally—I believe invariably—at all congresses and conferences that have been held in recent times, the rule has been that the representatives themselves, on their first meeting, should elect the person who should be their president, and settle the course of their future proceedings. A further custom has also grown up which, by lapse of time, has acquired almost the force of a rule, that, unless there be a special reason to the contrary, the representative of the power in the capital of whose country the conference or congress is held is the person elected for the purpose. It would, therefore, follow, that if the congress was held at Berlin, the presidency would probably be offered to Prince Bismarck; and I have no reason to suppose that, if he attends the congress at all, it would be his intention to decline it. If he were to do so, I apprehend that, according to usage, what would happen would be this—that the congress would proceed in the same manner as before to choose another president. I ought to add that, as far as I am aware or can learn, there is no special power or authority attached to the position of the president on such an occasion. He is *primus inter pares*. It is simply an honorary distinction. He has precisely the same rights and powers of dealing with subjects submitted to the conference that any other member has. Under those circumstances I

do not think it would be desirable to do that which certainly would be a very unusual step—to make it a condition of going into the congress that special rules of exclusion from the presidency should be applied to the representatives of one of the powers principally concerned. I am not aware that there is any precedent for a course of that kind being followed, and it is clear that no general rule can be laid down for the exclusion of the representatives of the belligerents. There have been cases, and there may be so again, of conferences attended by the representatives of the belligerent powers alone, and if a universal rule of exclusion were to be applied to them, there would be no person to preside at a conference. (Hansard, *op. cit.*, pp. 1039–1040.)

APPENDIX III.

(See supra, p. 28, note 2.)

Prince Gortchakoff, however brilliant he may have been at one time of his life, was not a man of business. He was skillful over phrasing, but kept always to generalities, and I do not exaggerate in affirming that before his failure of health he was incapable of pointing out on the map, even approximately, the different countries of the Balkan peninsula, or, for instance, the position of Kars and Batoum. When the prince talked business he liked to "tracer les magistrales," as he expressed it; in short, as he also said, to generalize. * * * I was, therefore, considerably alarmed when he informed me one fine day that he had given up all other questions to me, but that he specially reserved that of Batoum to himself. * * * He could deal with it directly with Lord Beaconsfield. * * * The Congress was drawing to a close. * * * Prince Bismarck, anxious to set off to Kissingen, endeavored to bring matters to a settlement and questioned me daily as to whether an agreement on the Asiatic frontier had been arrived at between Russia and Great Britain. I told him that Prince Gortchakoff had reserved this negotiation for his own handling. I made the same communication to the Marquis of Salisbury, who was drawing me very closely, and he replied with some vexation: "My dear Count, Lord Beaconsfield can not negotiate! He has never seen a map of Asia Minor!" * * * Prince Bismarck at last announced that if we were not ready within the next 24 hours he would start off. A few hours afterwards we heard to our relief that a complete agreement had been arrived at between Lord Beaconsfield and Prince Gortchakoff. The prince promised to announce it at the next sitting of the congress.

It must be stated, in order to understand what follows, that each of us possessed a map of Asia on which our *état major* had traced the frontier of the treaty of San Stefano in one particular color, and another line of different color to show the *ne plus ultra* of what the plenipotentiaries could yield to the insistence of Great Britain. Needless to add, the second line was, to some extent, a state secret.

This last assembly, devoted to the Asiatic question, was a serious occasion. On its result hung the issues of peace or war. The president suggested that the two negotiators, Lord Beaconsfield and Prince Gortchakoff, should sit side by side to point out the tenure of their agreement. The two gentlemen therefore took their places, each one spreading out before him a map traced for the occasion. We others stood in a group behind them. I at once foresaw the trouble and confusion that would ensue. Gortchakoff's map had one line only, that of San Stefano, and the prince declared emphatically that "my lord" had accepted it. Beaconsfield, however, replied to the prince's declaration by a laconic "No, no!" and pointed out, on his own map the line to which he had consented. Now, to my great astonishment, this line in all its sinuosities, was precisely the one that we had the right to accept as the extreme limit of our agreement.

The contradiction between the two plenipotentiaries tended to embitter the discussion. Each stood obstinately by his own line, when Prince Gortchakoff got up, seized my hand, and said to me: "There is some treachery; they have had the map of our *état major*."

I learned afterwards that on the previous day Gortchakoff had asked for a map of Asia Minor. He was given the confidential map of the two lines. He showed it to Lord Beaconsfield, lending it to him for a few hours so that Lord Salisbury could see it.

The Englishmen, noticing a line that threw back the frontier of San Stefano, had adopted it for their own map. This was the explanation of the imagined treachery. * * *

The president of the Congress, perceiving the two negotiators more and more entangled in their difficulty, ironically suggested compromise: The congress should be suspended for the space of half an hour, during which the second German plenipotentiary, Prince von Hohenlohe, should put the matter to the vote. * * * Well, the matter turned to our advantage. I stood by the line of San Stefano, the Marquis of Salisbury to the *ne plus ultra* traced by our *état major*. Prince von Hohenlohe proposed a middle line which would divide that under dispute into two equal parts. I accepted, and the question was decided. We signed the treaty two days afterwards. (From Souvenirs of P. Schouvaloff, quoted in Hanotaux, Contemporary France, Vol. IV, pp. 353-355.)

APPENDIX IV.

Sir William Vernon Harcourt on the principle of nationality (Hansard, Parliamentary Debates, 3d ser., vol. 237, pp. 1127-1130):

* * * But what is the true principle upon which you ought to go into this congress? I think if you want to get a permanent settlement of Europe, you should see what are the causes which have destroyed the previous settlement. The Treaty of Vienna of 1815 was negotiated by great statesmen. There were giants in the land in those days; but they made a gigantic blunder, and their work has failed. The Treaty of Vienna was signed 12 years before I was born, and in my lifetime I have seen every bit of it torn into fragments. The chain first broke where it was weakest, for a chain is no stronger than its weakest link. It broke in Greece. The emancipation of Greece under the influence of England, was the first breach in the Treaty of Vienna. Then followed the emancipation of Belgium; then that of Italy; then came the Holstein affair, and then the break-up of the German Confederation at the battle of Sadowa, and it was completed at the battle of Sedan. Why has the Treaty of Vienna failed? Because the negotiations were founded upon principles which were radically false. It had relation only to dynastic arrangements and geographical puzzles. It was made to suit the ambition of rulers, and it neglected altogether the interests and the sympathies of nationalities and populations. I do not wonder that the negotiators at Vienna made that mistake, fatal as it was. When after the deluge of the French Revolution, the spires of ancient institutions began to appear out of the flood, it was not unnatural that a different view should be taken from what is taken now; but the edifice was built of untempered mortar; it has broken down, and it now lies in ruins. What is it that has broken down that edifice; what is it that has worked like leaven in the lump; what is it that has destroyed the Treaty of 1815? It is the principle of nationalities. What is it that has made Prince Bismarck so strong in Europe? It is not his armies, great as they are; but it is because he has had the courage and the wisdom to grasp the principle of nationalities, by which he has ground his potentates to powder. What is it that has made Austria so weak? It is because, by the very conditions of her existence, she is the enemy of the principles of nationality and autonomy. What has made Russia so weak? Her treatment of Poland. What has made her so strong? Because she is the vindicator of oppressed races. ["Oh!"] Is she not strong? Is she not the vindicator of oppressed races? You dislike the Slavs. I do not know why. I daresay you know as much about them as I do. The Slavs are a great nationality. You can not extinguish them. They have their rights and their sympathies, and whether you like them or not they will assert their existence.

* * * England may appear at that conference in a character in which she would surpass the influence of Russia, for she might be the champion, not of one race, but of all the races there. I have heard a whisper of an Austrian alliance. Well, Sir, Austria has not had a fortunate history in modern Europe. And why? Because, from the conditions of her existence, she has been opposed to the principle of nationalities, and her Empire has broken away. Therefore it is that she has been obliged to have a dual Government and a dual policy. I should be glad that Her Majesty's Government should have the alliance of Austria for objects which England can desire

and approve—for the protection of Constantinople, for the preservation of the freedom of the navigation of the Straits and of the Danube; but if you are going to purchase that alliance by aiding her in paring down the autonomy of the Christian Provinces of Turkey—if that is what you desire, then I have a right to say that that is a policy not worthy of the English nation. I had hoped * * * that Her Majesty's Government would appear at the congress as the champion of those who have no power to defend themselves—I mean the Greek nationality. But what is the policy on which you ask our confidence? This is far more important than all these party squabbles, because this is the question on which the permanent peace of Europe depends, and upon which the future of England must rest. I hope, therefore, that before the end of this debate, we shall hear from Her Majesty's Government * * * what is the spirit in which you are going to the conference. Are you going to endeavor to save out of the wreck some miserable fragment of a ruined system; or are you going, as you ought to go, to call a new world into existence, to repair the scandals of the old? Are you going to this conference in the spirit of Castlereagh or in the spirit of Canning? That policy, which began by emancipating the Greeks, I hope you are not going to mar it, as the policy of Canning was marred by the Duke of Wellington and Lord Aberdeen. That is a question we have a right to ask before assenting to give you our confidence on the money which you say is required to strengthen you in the negotiations * * *.

APPENDIX V.

The following excerpt from *The Times* (July 9, 1878) indicates just how far the principle of nationality was considered in the Batoum question and generally in all questions before the Congress:

The Agence Russe says:

"At no stage of the deliberations, even when the question raised was that Russia should concede the Balkan range as the frontier of Turkey, have there been such numerous discussions, pourparlers, and interviews between the Russian and English plenipotentiaries as have been required for the settlement of the Batoum question * * *. Nevertheless, at the meeting of the Commission and the interviews held on Saturday, the question had already made progress toward solution. An agreement had been come to upon the subject of making Batoum a free port and upon the words 'an essentially commercial port,' but yesterday Lord Salisbury, at an interview with Prince Gortchakoff, brought forward the subject of the Lazes, a population numbering in all 40,000, of whom there are only 15,000 in the territory which Russia is to receive. Lord Salisbury asked that in the cession to be made to Russia the territory occupied by these Lazes should not be included in consequence of the declarations made by them in their recent address to the British Parliament that they would not submit to the Russian authorities. His lordship based his argument upon the principle of nationalities and plebiscites, which he said the Congress had up to the present made the bases of its deliberations. Prince Gortchakoff replied that the Congress, on the contrary, had in nowise respected this principle either as regards the Bulgarians or the Greeks. His Highness added that as the territory in question was adjacent to the town of Batoum itself, the arrangement proposed by Lord Salisbury would be a constant cause of conflict, especially in view of the shameful trade in Circassian women and children for the harems of Constantinople. Prince Gortchakoff further argued that the address alluded to possessed no significance, as it was promoted by the British consuls. Lord Beaconsfield, it is said, subsequently stated with more precision the essence of the demands made by Lord Salisbury, and a compromise appears to have been the result."

APPENDIX VI.

Beaconsfield's threatened withdrawal from the Congress, as told by A. N. Cumming in *The Nineteenth Century and After*, July, 1905, pages 83-90:

On the morning after that decision [adjournment to await the Russian answer on Bulgaria] Lord Beaconsfield came into my room. He said: "I have been thinking over this matter very seriously most of the night, and I have quite made up my mind what to do. It seems to me impossible for Russia to concede these points, and, if they refuse, I have sketched out my plan. We will return to England at once. My desire is, if possible, to get to London upon Sunday night and to have a good night's rest. On Monday morning I shall go down to Osborne—or Windsor—and after lunch I propose to lay my report before Her Majesty. A declaration of war with Russia will follow. Kindly make the necessary arrangements for our journey." "I rang for a Bradshaw," said Lord Rowton, "and spent some time in studying it. I found, as a matter of fact, that it would be impossible for us to carry out Lord Beaconsfield's plan. The trains did not suit. We could only get to London on the Sunday night if we took a special train from Cologne. Accordingly, without any hesitation, I wrote out a telegram to the station master at Cologne—whom I happened to know—a colonel somebody—they are all old military officers in Germany—ordering him to have a special train ready for Lord Beaconsfield and myself at such and such an hour on the specified day.

"You may be surprised to hear it, but that telegram was the turning point of the whole affair. The next day or the day after I was walking along a few yards from our hotel when I met Prince Bismarck driving in an open carriage. He stopped it and asked me where Lord Beaconsfield was. I told him that he was in the hotel, and Prince Bismarck asked: 'Can I see him?' 'Yes,' I replied. Then he pulled out his watch and said: 'Look here; at the present moment it is 12 minutes to 4, and I am due with my prince at the palace at 4 o'clock. I wish to see Lord Beaconsfield, and I shall go up to him, but I wish you to come to us at 5 minutes to 4 sharp and announce to me the exact time.' We went along to the hotel, and I showed him up to Lord Beaconsfield's room. Punctually at 5 minutes to 4 I knocked on the door. When I went in, the two were talking about the horribly bad paving of the Wilhelmstrasse. I begged their pardon and told Prince Bismarck that it was 5 minutes to 4. He bowed and thanked me and I left the room. In two minutes the door opened, Prince Bismarck came out, got into his carriage, and drove away. He would reach the palace punctually at 4 o'clock. I went in to Lord Beaconsfield and apologized for having intruded. He said, 'Don't mention it, my dear Corry; you no doubt had a very good reason for what you did. But a very curious thing occurred. The moment after you left the room Bismarck turned sharply to me. We had been talking on indifferent subjects before, but now he said: 'Lord Beaconsfield, do these four points really represent England's ultimatum to Russia?' And I said, 'Yes; they do.'

"The Congress met again for a final decision on this matter at the appointed time. Whilst the meeting was going on I waited outside as usual. After a sitting of a couple

of hours, the door opened, and I noticed particularly that the Russians came out first, Schouvaloff at their head. Lord Beaconsfield, as was his custom, came out last of all, and when he was going away he took my arm and said: 'My dear Corry, I have seen what I never expected to see. Russia has given way on all four points.' We subsequently discovered, of course, that my telegram to the station master at Cologne had been promptly transmitted to Prince Bismarck. He thereupon saw that Lord Beaconsfield was in earnest. He knew, and this we did not discover until a good deal later, that as a matter of fact the Russians had received orders from the Tsar practically to submit to anything rather than go to war with England. He knew that, but we did not. Both at the first interview of which I told you, and after that lucky telegram of mine to Cologne, he saw that Lord Beaconsfield was in earnest. He had taken the measure of the man, he told the Russians what the fact was, and the result was that they gave in. I may tell you further that the Russian pretext that they must consult the Tsar upon the question of those four points was a mere blind. They did send off a messenger—one of their highest diplomats—but we learned later on that he left the train at Königsberg and did not proceed any farther (pp. 87-88)."





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